The Return of Article 42: Enemy of the Good for Collective Security by Rumage, Sarah
Pace International Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 1 Article 7
January 1993
The Return of Article 42: Enemy of the Good for
Collective Security
Sarah Rumage
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
International Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation




THE RETURN OF ARTICLE 42: ENEMY
OF THE GOOD FOR COLLECTIVE
SECURITY
Sarah Rumaget
"The best is the enemy of the good."'
"Human beings do not ever make laws; it is the accidents and
catastrophes of all kinds happening in every conceivable way, that
make laws for us."'
t Sarah Rumage, J.D. New York Law School 1982; M.A. History, New York Univer-
sity 1993; LL.M. New York University 1993; Member of the Committee on Military Af-
fairs and Justice of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
I am deeply grateful to Professor Thomas M. Franck, not only for his helpful com-
ments but for his unparalleled teaching and his many kindnesses to me. I would also like
to thank the other "Great Minds" - Anthony D'Amato, Richard Falk, Michael Reis-
man, Louis Henkin, Eugene Rostow, Al Rubin, Oscar Schachter, and Burns Weston -
who made this article possible, all of whom graciously answered my numerous (and often
impertinent) questions at various ASIL meetings - a busy time when they had people
far more famous than myself to talk to. I will do my best to emulate their wisdom and
great generosity of spirit. Special thanks is also owed to Janet Fong, without whom this
article would have disappeared into unsaved computer oblivion long ago, as well as to the
library staff at the Hague Academy of International Law, all of whom worked very hard
to indulge my outrageous book requests.
This article, my first, is dedicated to Professor Myres S. McDougal, my first profes-
sor of international law and the most immortal of all the great minds. It is also dedicated
to all the men and women who fought in the conflicts discussed herein, especially my late
grandfather Dr. William T. Rumage (World War I), and his sons Bill (World War II) my
uncle, and Joe (Korea) my father. May all who serve, serve as well, and in causes in
which they can believe. Finally, this article is also dedicated to my mother, Nancy S.
Rumage, and her late parents, the Most Rev. and Mrs. William A. Simms, who first told
me the story of the League of Nations, and of their precious dream for a warless world.
1. VOLTAIRE, Dramatic Arts, in PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY (H.I. Woolf trans., 1945).
2. Plato, Laws IV 709.
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INTRODUCTION
Should the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 (hereafter Second
Gulf Crisis)' be characterized as a United Nations Security
Council "international enforcement action" under Articles 42
through 50, or as an Article 51 "collective self-defense action"
subsequently sanctioned by the Security Council? The founding
fathers of modern international law, preoccupied with the "just-
ness" of war, would not have been unduly concerned with the
answer.4 However, in our age, the name of the rule has assumed
a fundamental importance, for at least some of its perceived au-
3. Although some scholars refer to it as a "war," it is called a "crisis" here to differ-
entiate it from traditional, pre-Charter warfare concepts. The word "crisis" also helps to
distinguish it from the recent Iran-Iraq War, which was a formally declared war not
conducted under Security Council auspices or under the recognized parameters of self-
defense. The "First Gulf Crisis" refers to the 1987-88 involvement of the United States
in vessel escort operations in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War, including the
September 21, 1987 attack on an Iranian Navy ship laying mines.
4. See Theodor Meron, Common Rights of Mankind in Gentili, Grotius and Suarez,
85 AM. J. INT'L L. 110 (1991); David Kennedy, Primitive Legal Scholarship, 27 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 1 (1986). Kennedy explains this issue differentiation:
Traditional scholars begin with the sovereign act, assess its status as public or
private, and come to some conclusion about the legal sphere which it structures.
They might suggest, for example, that all wars publicly declared by a sovereign
are just. In contrast, the primitive scholars begin with an idea of justice, grounded
in a moral/legal order which defined sovereignty and the capacities of sovereigns.
Justice entrusts sovereigns with certain prerogatives, among them the capacity to
engage in wars. Private wars, not expressive of sovereign capacity, are unjust.
Id. at 9.
However, the "primitives" would have had a more critical interest in the issue than
nineteenth century jurists, for whom war was "value-neutral and ultimately power-
based." Michael Reisman, Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law, 10
YALE J. INT'L L. 279, 281 (1985). See HIDEMI SUGANAMI, THE DoMESTIc ANALOGY AND
WORLD ORDER PROPOSALS (1989). In the nineteenth century, "states were free to employ
force and go to war for any reason or no reason." Military and Paramilitary Activities
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 200 (June 27) (dissenting opinion of Judge Schwe-
bel). A decision to use force was regarded as simply a method of conducting international
relations-one choice among many, and it "enjoyed close to a full measure of legitimacy
under international law." Edward Gordon, Article 2(4) in Historical Context, 10 YALE J.
INT'L L. 271 (1985).
Even into World War I, war was not only "legal", but had the effect of suspending
the operation of law. Philip Marshall Brown, War and Law, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. 162, 163
(1918). ("Once war has arrived, however, the maxim inter arma silent leges must prevail.
War is the abandonment of litigation and argument. It is the negation of law.") It was
"[o]nly when the universal liberty to go to war was eliminated," that issues of self-de-
fense and collective security could emerge and gain claimants right-holders' status.
YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 166 (1988).
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thority lies in its lineage.' Even the most fondly treasured max-
ims can lose their legitimacy once their dubious parentage is laid
bare.'
Moreover, the choice of characterizing the Second Gulf Cri-
sis and its definitive work product, Security Council Resolution
678,1 inevitably gives rise to other issues. Rejecting an Article 42
interpretation, and forcing the Second Gulf Crisis into the clas-
sification of an Article 51 action, effectively steers away from
any pretense of Security Council oversight, never mind control.
Article 51 proponents will tolerate some Security Council med-
dling but arduously insist that Article 51 is little more than a
license to wage a war of self-defense without de facto Security
Council authorization; anything less would be an impermissible
surrender of sovereignty.8
5. "To be sure, the source of every rule-its pedigree... is one determinant of how
strong its pull to compliance is likely to be. Pedigree, however, is far from being the only
indicator of how seriously the rule will be taken, particularly if the rule conflicts with a
state's perceived self-interest." Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International Sys-
tem, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1988). For a more comprehensive and provocative explora-
tion of the roles of authority and legitimacy in international law, see THOMAS M. FRANCK,
THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).
6. See A. Vaughn Lowe, Do General Rules of International Law Exist? 9 REV. INT'L
STUD. 207, 211 (1983), which questions the legitimacy of, if not "the logical necessity"
for, the most basic international norms, such as pacta sunt servanda. See also N.
Czaplinski & G. Danilenko, Conflicts of Norms in International Law, 21 NETHERLANDS
YB. OF INT'L L. 1, 7 (1990). For an able defense of general rules of international law as
encompassed in pacta sunt servanda (and a persuasive argument for their existence), see
Hidemi Suganami, A Normative Enquiry in International Relations: The Case of
"Pacta Sunt Servanda", 9 REV. INT'L STUD. 35 (1983), as well as Suganami's thoughtful
criticisms of Professor Lowe's position, Hidemi Suganami, A. V. Lowe on General Rules
of International Law, 10 REV. INT'L STUD. 175 (1984); but see A. Vaughn Lowe, A Reply,
10 REV. INT'L STUD. 183 (1984), for what surely looks like, but cannot be, the last word.
7. See infra notes 194-203 and accompanying text.
8. Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, U.N. Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old
Order Changeth," 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 63-70 (1991). But Schachter's view balances
these concerns:
There are some who challenge the basic idea that the security of a state-its self-
preservation-can and should be subjected to international law. . . . The relation-
ship of national security and international law is inevitably complicated and
fluid. . .but I have accepted a basic premise-namely, that the right of self-de-
fense, 'inherent' though it may be, can not be autonomous. To consider it as above
or outside the law renders it more probable that force will be used unilaterally and
abusively.
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Some of America's most preeminent constitutional law
scholars 9 and at least fifty-four United States Congressmen °
have gone through great intellectual pain to take an even more
distant stance. This group contends that the U.S., although still
the most prominent military power in the world, is simply pow-
erless to act militarily, even under the aegis of the Security
Council, absent a formal Congressional declaration of war.1' This
scenario, in effect, subjects all U.N. Chapter VII actions "to the
same constitutional strictures as the old system's unilateral acts
of war - acts that the Charter, with very limited exceptions, has
prohibited."' 2 Indeed, both groups seem to miss fundamental
points. The Charter's first and foremost aim is "to save suc-
ceeding generations from the scourge of war."1 3 It is a simple but
impressive goal that requires nothing less than the maintenance
of "international peace and security."
1
Furthermore, Article 2(4) of the Charter effectively outlaws
9. This group includes, but is not limited to: Michael Glennon, infra note 11; Louis
Henkin, infra note 11; Harold Hongju Koh, author of Why the President (Almost) Al-
ways Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255
(1988); and Professor Raven-Hansen of George Washington University Law School.
10. See Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990). Compare with Lowry v.
Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987) (a similar case brought by 110 U.S. Congressmen
as plaintiffs).
11. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 160 (1972): "[N]o
treaty has ever been designed to put the United States into a state of war without a
declaration of Congress." See also Michael J. Glennon, The Constitution and Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 74, 80 (1991); The Gulf War and
the Constitution, FOREIGN AFF. 84, 92 (Spring, 1991). Self-defense is the most important
exception to this view of strict constitutional constructionism. Its strong historical roots
help explain its persistent entrenchment in the modern mind as well as within significant
scholarship, despite the fact that the UN Charter clearly dispenses with individual Mem-
ber State declarations of war. This is particularly evident in the case of the United
States. See, e.g., DANIEL G. LANG, FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 155 (1985).
12. Franck & Patel, supra note 8, at 64.
13. U.N. CHARTER, Preamble. Such aims are noble but these affirmations are contra-
dicted by the actual conduct of Member States who engage in large-scale wars, invade
countries and then freely use armed forces "to topple governments, to seize territory, to
avenge past injustice, or to impose settlements. Threats of force, open or implicit, per-
vade the relations of states." Oscar Schachter, International Law: The Right of States
To Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1620 (1984).
For a review of the role of codification in creating international law, see Oscar
Schachter, The Nature and Process of Legal Development in International Society, in
THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, Doc-
TRINE AND THEORY 773 (R. MacDonald & D. Johnston eds., 1983).
14. U.N. CHARTER, art. 1.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol5/iss1/7
19931 ARTICLE 42 AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY
"'war" as a traditional pursuit of "diplomacy by other means."",
Seeking to emphasize this change by omission, Article 2(4) does
not even use the word "war". 16 War is no longer a viable option
for any U.N. Member State, with three very narrow exceptions:
1) Article 2(7) belligerencies "which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state;"' 7 2) the enforcement actions
of Articles 42 through 50,11 and 3) the self-defense actions of Ar-
ticle 51."9
15. "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER, art.
2, para. 4.
Given the recurrent frequency of armed aggression between states since adoption of
the U.N. Charter, some scholars question whether Article 2(4) even approaches norma-
tive status. See Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Recourse to Force: A
Shift in Paradigms, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 45 (1990), describing Article 2(4) as "simply
no longer authoritative and controlling." Even generally optimistic scholars with a great
appreciation of the utility of international organizations have vented their frustrations
with the paradox of Article 2(4)'s repeated affirmation, but non-application, by Member
States in their international affairs. See Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64
AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 809 (1970), cf. Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article
2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 544 (1971).
As Oscar Schachter points out: "We know that the principle [of Article 2(4)] was
intended to outlaw war in its classic sense, that is, the use of military force to acquire
territory or other benefits from another state." Schachter, supra note 13, at 1624.
16. Schachter, supra note 13, at 1624. The word war is not even used in Article 2(4)
which was a departure from the League of Nations Covenant and the Kellog-Briand Pact
of 1928. According to Schachter, "[tihe term 'force' was thus a more factual and wider
word to embrace military action." Id.
17. "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Char-
ter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
Chapter VII." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. Yet this policy is clearly changing in cases
where internal conflict "produces sustained domestic violence and intense international
concern." Richard A. Falk & Saul H. Mendlovitz, Towards a Warless World: One Legal
Formula -to Achieve Transition, 73 YALE L.J. 399, 412-413 (1964).
In fact, Falk and Mendlovitz observe that "U.N. practice discloses a willingness to
disregard the constraints of 2(7) whenever an ardent consensus can be mobilized in the
General Assembly." Id. at 413.
18. Articles 42 through 50 essentially encompass what are known as "Chapter VII
actions" considered apart from art. 51, discussed supra, note 17. Article 51 preserves the
concept of traditional war, but limits it as a response to an illegal use of force and fur-
ther narrows it as an "inherent right of self-defense." Article 51, although physically
located in Chapter VII of the Charter, is really an exception to it.
19. U.N. Charter Article 51 states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the
5
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Clearly, a U.S. congressional declaration of war no longer
means what it did prior to the signing of the Charter. In fact, it
is quite a fair question to ask whether such a congressional dec-
laration means anything at all anymore, for it cannot make any
war, conflict, or use of armed force "legal" unless it is actually
legal under the Charter. 0 Conversely, Congressional withholding
of a declaration of war cannot make the United States role in an
armed conflict illegal if the action is sanctioned by the Security
Council.21
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to main-
tain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise
of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
As Joyner notes, "[tlhe strict test under international law legally sanctioning such a
military response is the presence of some real and immediate imperilment to a state."
Christopher C. Joyner, The United States Action in Grenada: Reflections on the Law-
fulness of Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131, 133 (1984).
Even military interference "by invitation" to uphold a friendly regime may be
wrongful and violate the Charter where the use of force is excessive, or violates "the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state." U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
Apart from being simply wrongful, such extra-Charter military excursions have been
characterized as "irrational overreactions" which often result in "the initiation of vio-
lence without anticipation of the scope and dire nature of such action." See ROBERT
MANDEL, IRRATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL CONFRONTATION 73-81 (1987).
20. See Thomas M. Franck, Declare War? Congress Can't, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
1990, at A27. (opining that Congress' power to declare war is superfluous where the U.N.
has authorized military force). But see John M. Hillebrecht, In U.S., Constitution Su-
persedes U.N. Charter, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1990, at A22 (letter to the editor), (arguing
that the United States Constitution supersedes the power of the U.N. Charter).
21. Declarations of traditional war made outside the Charter's exceptions of self-
defense and authorized police enforcement actions are simply not legal under interna-
tional law. This is not to say that wars, in the traditional sense, have ceased to occur. In
fact, very detailed sets of rules regulating war remain in force, despite war's general pro-
hibition by the Charter and the express agreement of all Member States not to engage in
it. These include various sets of rules popularly known as the Geneva and Hague Con-
ventions. See, e.g., Convention (I) For the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Conven-
tion (II) For the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (III) Rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 157 B.F.S.P.
284; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. The 1949 Geneva Conventions were augmented by the 1977
Protocols I and II, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 139 (1977). See also Hague Convention of 1899
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land; Regulations Respecting the Laws
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol5/iss1/7
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The issue of constitutional war powers in conflict with the
U.N. Charter seems to portray a uniquely American dilemma.
This conflict has had enormous ramifications for all Member
States, since its decipherment will determine the ultimate worth
of all future Security Council votes. What is the value of a Se-
curity Council resolution, when it can be effectively nullified by
a U.S. Congressional refusal to participate, or be subject to a
U.S. court's judgment that the resolution was unconstitutional?
The obvious absurdity of such a result belies a mischievous iso-
lationism and anti-internationalism that has long characterized
the U.S.' ambivalent behavior at the U.N.2" Why should any
Member state comply with its Article 25 obligations2" or render
and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the Hague Convention (IV) of 1907; American
Rules of Land Warfare (1940); and the British Manual of Military Law (1929). An excel-
lent treatise on these rules is EDWARD K. KWAKWA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT (1992).
22. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, NATION AGAINST NATION: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE U.N.
DREAM AND WHAT THE U.S. CAN Do ABOUT IT (1985). See also Flora Lewis, The Value of
the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1982, at A23; Burton Y. Pines, The U.S. and the U.N.:
Time for Reappraisal, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER, Sept. 29, 1983. Per-
haps Calvin Coolidge said it best in 1923, when he blithely informed Congress: "The
League [of Nations] exists as a foreign agency. We hope it will be helpful. But the
United States sees no reason to limit its own freedom and independence of action by
joining it." See also JAMES M. BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE Fox 248 (1956):
Outside Washington were the millions of voters who held the destinies of foreign
policy makers in their hands. And here was the most unstable foundation of all on
which to build a consistent program of foreign relations. Great numbers of these
voters were colossally ignorant of foreign affairs beyond the three-mile limit; as
the old story went, they were more concerned about a dogfight on Main Street
than a flare-up in distant Ruritania. Others were rigidly bound by loyalties ab-
sorbed in the countries of their natural origin. Still others were prisoners of an-
cient fears and shibboleths: that wily foreign diplomats always played Uncle Sam
for a sucker, that America had never lost a war and never won a peace conference,
that salvation lay in keeping free of entangling alliances.
But see JOHN MUELLER, RETREAT FROM DOOMSDAY: THE OBSOLESCENCE OF MAJOR WAR
98, 108 (1988):
Most Americans, however, felt a sense of guilt about the war [World War II], con-
cluding that irresponsible American isolationism was exactly what had brought it
about, giving aggressors the illusion that they could strike without having to take
on the American colossus. Furthermore, since the United States was now by far
the strongest nation on the globe, it should grow up and take its rightful place in
international politics. As the perceived Soviet threat began to loom over war-torn
Europe, it also became clear to most that the United States was the only country
capable of leading an effective opposition.
23. Also known as the "duty" article, U.N. CHARTER art. 25 states: "The Members of
the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in
7
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Article 2(5) assistance 24 when the U.S. can excuse its own failure
to perform by invoking the various and sundry declarations of
its domestic political bodies? A U.S. Congressional declaration
of war, although politically desirable, was not legally necessary
for the United States' engagement of its forces in the Second
Gulf Crisis. This hardly means that Congress would have no role
to play; Congress still has the ultimate war-making power-the
power of the purse (exercisable at its peril, but exercisable none-
theless). However, it does mean that Congress's role changed
greatly after the signing of the Charter in 1945, and lacks the
prominence in international conflicts that it would have in the
case of a purely domestic civil war involving no other state.
This article seeks to prove the return of Article 42 as a via-
ble Charter provision. Part I sets forth some of the most promi-
nent legal theories today on the issue of whether the Second
Gulf Crisis constituted an Article 42 or Article 51 U.N. action.
Part II historically depicts the United States' actions in the Ko-
rean Conflict as a clear example of Article 42 in use. Part III
examines the constitutional strength of Article 42 and demon-
strates that it is indeed the law of the Charter as well as the
"law of the land," and can exist-even thrive-without Article
43 agreements. Part IV appraises the Security Council Resolu-
tions during the Second Gulf Crisis, in particular the ambigui-
ties of Resolution 678. This article concludes that the handling
of the Second Gulf Crisis more closely constitutes an interna-
tional enforcement action based on Article 42, rather than an
Article 51 self-defense action.
I. WHAT DO THE GREAT MINDS SAY? ARTICLE 42 OR 51?
The most cursory perusal of recent scholarship shows a spir-
ited divergence of opinion on the issues presented above, prov-
ing that great minds do not always think alike.25
accordance with the present Charter."
24. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 5 provides more generally for rendering assistance to
the Security Council: "All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any
action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving
assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforce-
ment action."
25. The 'great minds' refers to: Professor Thomas Franck, Faiza Patel, supra note 8;
Eugene V. Rostow, infra note 29; Burns H. Weston, infra note 33; Oscar Schachter,
[Vol. 5:211
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A. Thomas Franck and Faiza Patel: The Article 42 Argument
Professor Thomas Franck and Faiza Patel contend that the
handling of the Second Gulf Crisis was an Article 42 global "col-
lective police action." They describe Article 42 as "a new alter-
native to traditional wars of self-defense" under Article 51.26
Furthermore, Franck and Patel assert that, while an Article 51
action remains an "inherent" right, the "old [Article 51] way is
licensed only until the new [Article 42, for global action, or Arti-
cle 53, for regional action] way begins to work: 'Until,' in the
words of Article 51, 'the Security Council has taken the neces-
sary measures to maintain international peace and security.' "27
Anticipating some academic outcry, Franck and Patel blame
any Article 42 reliance problems on its desuetude. They force-
fully maintain "[tihat this new system has rarely worked as in-
tended. . . [with] the Cold War at an end, the system now has a
chance to demonstrate whether it works-to call itself into being
and with it the new world order intended in 1945. ' '2s
B. Eugene Rostow: The Article 51 Argument
Conversely, Eugene Rostow asserts that the Second Gulf
Crisis was strictly an Article 51 collective self-defense action. 29
supra note 8. This list is by no means exclusive, and we cautiously pause before the
flashing light of Quintilian's dictum urging modesty and circumspection in judging great
minds, "since there is always the risk of falling into the common fault of condemning
what one does not understand." INSTITUTIO ORATIA X, i, at 26 (H.E. Butler trans.).
26. Franck & Patel, supra note 8, at 63.
Regardless of whether the Second Gulf Crisis is determined to be based on Article
42 or Article 51, there is no doubt that, because the Security Council was able to respond
effectively, the traditionally broad invocation of Article 51 has been implicitly curtailed.
27. Id. at 63. This view goes beyond a choice of articles. It would act as a brake
upon the power of Member States to resort to traditional uses of force. Rostow, infra
note 29, at 511, rejects this view.
28. Franck & Patel, supra note 8, at 63. See ALF Ross, THE UNITED NATIONS: PEACE
AND PROGRESS 38, 40 (1966):
The system of the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and
security is the expression of a new and bold construction of a more realistic type
than that of the League of Nations ...
It would be incorrect to say that this security system has failed. It has simply
never been realized or tested.
29. Eugene V. Rostow, Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense,
85 AM. J. INT'L L. 506, 506 (1991). See also RICHARD CONNAUGHTON, MILITARY INTERVEN-
TION IN THE 1990s: A NEw LOGIC OF WAR 5-9 (1992).
19931
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Furthermore, he warns that to conclude otherwise would "evis-
cerate Article 51,113o undermine the Security Council's veto
power, unleash global chaos, and "[iut could even destroy the
United Nations.'31
C. Professor Burns Weston: Article 42 Perhaps?
Professor Burns Weston has characterized the Second Gulf
Crisis as an illegitimate, unilateral "military campaign '' 3" full of
hidden terrors and moral dilemmas. He laments that the Secur-
ity Council did not wait to authorize the use of force until all
hope of persuading Iraq to relinquish Kuwait through economic
30. Id. at 506.
31. Id. For a similar conclusion, see RONALD STEEL, IMPERIALISTS AND OTHER HE-
ROES: A CHRONICLE OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 166 (1971). "The UN Charter is flexible, to
be sure, but it cannot be stretched too far without endangering the existence of the or-
ganization itself." Id. But see Ross, supra note 28, at 29-53, 162-184 for the contention
that the UN will not survive unless the great powers are able to implement their foreign
policies through its institutions.
Although forecasting the end of the UN has often been the subject of journalistic
squabbling and something of a graduate student's parlor game, Cassandra-like wailings
from distinguished international jurists are relatively rare. In fact, writers from the
school of negative international organizational jurisprudence are far more likely to make
bloodthirsty, snarling sounds. See SHIRLEY HAZARD, DEFEAT OF AN IDEAL: A STUDY OF THE
SELF-DESTRUCTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1973). See HILLEL SEIDMAN, UNITED NA-
TIONS: PERFIDY AND PERVERSION (1982). See also DANIEL MOYNIHAN, A DANGEROUS PLACE
(1973); JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, 1 LEGITIMACY AND FORCE 20 (1988).
32. Weston states the U.S., ever the international ringmaster made the U.N. "stand
on its head and turned Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar into the Bush Administra-
tion's 'file clerk and messenger boy.' " Weston, infra note 33, at 526. Why Professor Wes-
ton did not simply say "toady" and be done with it remains a mystery, but it clearly was
not from any compulsion of self-restraint. In a conversation with this author at the
ASIL's 1992 Annual meeting, not only was Professor Weston wholly unrepentant, but he
voiced his regret that life afforded so few opportunities for similarly honest expression.
While Professor Weston gets points for honesty, it is worth remembering that the
Secretary-General's role is a difficult one; his tasks are frequently thankless, and his of-
fice is always an easy target. In the Korean Conflict, then-Secretary-General Trygve Lie
was similarly pilloried by the Soviets as a "coward," a "right-wing Socialist," a "stooge of
Wall Street," and an "abettor of American aggression who is helping to wreck the United
Nations." Russians Vilify Lie as Tool of the West, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1950, at Al. The
Organization itself was branded "a lap dog which Truman can lead on a leash," and the
six voting Security Council delegates were labeled "bloody fools"- the U.S. delegate a
"talking fool, Sir Terence Shone of Britain "an old fool of the old diplomatic school," the
French delegate Jean Chauvel "a fool with the rank of ambassador;" Arne Sunde of Nor-
way "a fool by virtue of necessity," the Ecuadorian "a fool with pretensions. of philo-
sophic knowledge," and the Cuban a "marionette fool, who jerks up his hand every time
the Americans pull his string." Id.
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sanctions had been definitively extinguished.33 He blasts the am-
biguity of Resolution 678, S preferring to view it "as a license to
use force only as a last resort, [whereas] President [Bush] chose
to construe it as an unconditional warrant to go to war come
January 15."1 Weston, if he had his way, would re-number Res-
olution 678 as a Bondian 007 directive, "a virtual unrestricted
license to kill and destroy.""6 Weston also decries the coalition's
inadequate "[T]hird World representation 3 7 and pouts that no-
body in the coalition wore a blue helmet.
3 8
It is a pity that Weston founders so long on the shoals of
ethical determinism, because his eventual exploration of legal is-
sues leads him to an Article 42 justification. Initially, Weston
rejects an Article 42 characterization because of the Article's
"dependent relationship with Article 43."' 39 Yet, "[a]n Article 51
justification, too, seems elusive.'40 Nor is he comfortable with
33. Burns H. Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision
Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 530 (1991). The theory of eco-
nomic sanctions is that by causing populations to suffer varying degrees of economic
discomfort and even harm, their (often totalitarian) leadership will change its moral
character and bow to the international will. This is a peculiarly liberalist concept. Like
many pedagogical notions, economic sanctions sometimes work after a very long time
(e.g. South Africa), and sometimes they have a more perverse incentive (Cuba)-even
though they plunge the poor into even deeper misery. What Weston fails to consider is
the problems of application of prolonged economic sanctions. Enforcing sanctions
through blockade and embargo can be extremely volatile, giving rise to serious "inci-
dents" which may well result in the application of deadly force, especially in a case
where a country is heavily armed, as Iraq was at the time of the Second Gulf Crisis.
Economic sanctions which, to be meaningful, may involve the arrest of cargo and the
boarding of ships at sea, the forcing down of aircraft, and creation of roadblock inspec-
tions, rarely remain peaceful for any length of time.
34. See infra notes 199-263 and accompanying text.
35. Weston, supra note 33, at 530.
36. Id at 532-33.
37. Id. at 527.
38. Id. at 521-22. Certainly, the U.N. flag, flown in conjunction with other standards
of participating Member States (as in the Korean Conflict), would have been entirely
appropriate, and would have "underline[d] the United Nations character of all the forces
under [U.S. command]." Walter H. Waggoner, U.S. Pushes Tie-In to U.N. on Korea,
N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1950, at Al. The blue helmet, however, may have acquired a connota-
tion making it less suitable for use in actual combat. Affectionately called a "blueberry",
its use by U.N. peacekeeping troops has come to represent that the forces are working
under the U.N. authority in a peace-seeking manner, non-aggressively. See gen. MICHAEL
HARBOTTLE, THE BLUE BERETS (1971).
39. Weston, supra note 33, at 519.
40. Id. at 520.
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Article 39, although this was the Security Council's Article of
choice for the Korean Conflict of 1950. The use of military force
in Korea, sniffs Weston, "was scarcely the kind of recommenda-
tion the Charter drafters had in mind when they adopted Article
39.'" 1 Unfortunately, Weston sheds little light on what he thinks
the framers of Resolution 678 did have in mind-perhaps more
economic sanctions? However, in taking another look at Article
42, he comes perilously close to Franck's view:
[O]ne is left to conclude that the Security Council created an
entirely new precedent, seemingly on the basis of some assumed
penumbra of powers available to the Council under chapter
VII-an 'Article 42 1/2' authorization, as some UN watchers have
called it. Not that there is anything inherently wrong about such
a development. It is analogous to the judicially developed penum-
bra of powers available to the President of the United States in
the conduct of foreign relations under the U.S. Constitution.4 2
41. Id. at 521. Weston's rejection of an Article 39 basis is somewhat convoluted, and
the Charter basis of the Korean conflict deserves an analysis which, because of time
constraints, is simply beyond the scope of this paper. It is sufficient to say here that
Weston's remark about Article 39 is specious-how can anyone determine, without at
least some doubt, what was in another's mind, especially in the past? Constitutions are
drafted to have more staying power than simple statutes; their creators are not expected
to have included in them every conceivable application for every exigency. Constitutions,
expressive of the people's collective will, are supposed to last. The fact is that only five
years had elapsed between the Charter's adoption and the Korean invasion; nobody was
shocked that Article 39 was used-it obviously solved the Article 43 dilemma, and the
Member States were in a hurry because the North Korean Army had destroyed the
South Korean Army and seized the southern capitol in less than four days. See, e.g.,
Walter H. Waggoner, State Dept. Seeks Way to Form Unified U.N. Force, N.Y. TIMEs,
July 2, 1950, at Al. The situation was "desperate and rapidly deteriorating;" scores of
people were being killed, and the Communists were in de facto possession of the country.
See U.S. State Dept. doc., U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, Telegram No. 688, June 30, 1950. lp.,
TOP SECRET, declass. Nov. 17, 1975. TRUMAN LIBRARY, GEORGE M. ELSEY PAPERS.
Moreover, prominent international law jurists have long recognized that Articles 39 and
42 are "closely connected." See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151,
274-5 (Advisory Opinion of July 20, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koretsky).
42. Weston, supra note 33, at 522. Franck also supports the idea of Charter
"penumbras", and applies it to substantiate a police power to enforce democratic entitle-
ment: "The World Court observed in the Bernadotte case that established rights and
duties implicitly validate a penumbra of unenunciated, yet legitimate, means necessary
to give them effect. If the 'end' of global peace demands the 'means' of global democracy,
a Charter-based system established to ensure peace must also be presumed to be author-
ized to ensure universal adherence to democratic political rights." Thomas M. Franck,
The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 89 (1992), foot-
notes omitted. The penumbra language, of course, comes from Justice White's concur-
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D. Oscar Schachter: Leaning more towards Article 51
Oscar Schachter is much less troubled than Weston by the
coalition's structure and leadership. Likewise, he is not offended
by the speediness with which the Security Council acted to au-
thorize the use of military force in Kuwait. In 1991 Schachter
wrote "[w]hether a longer period would have been effective re-
mains conjectural, but there is no doubt that the council had the
legal right to decide on the need for military action."4 s Neither
does Schachter find the Security Council's failure to declare the
inadequacy of the economic sanctions, prior to authorizing the
use of force, especially relevant, since there is nothing in the
Charter specifically requiring it and "the debates indicate that
several members believed that the sanctions would prove to be
inadequate to bring about a withdrawal by Iraq."""
rence in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 381-486 (1965): Some rights which ema-
nate from the Constitution "have penumbras, formed by emanations from these
guarantees that help give them life and substance." Id. at 484.
43. Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L.
452, 463 (1991). Moreover, three months is not an insignificant period of time, given the
circumstances and objectives. But see United Nations Security Council, Provisional Ver-
batim Record [hereafter S/PV. 2932 et seq.], S/PV. 2963, Nov. 29, 1990. 1 THE KUWAIT
CRISIS: BAsic DOCUMENTS 163 (Lauterpacht et al, eds. 1991) [Mr. AI-Ashtal of Yemen]:
It is a little surprising that those who used to lecture us on the need to be patient
for sanctions to work when they had to do with Rhodesia or South Africa are
today in such a hurry to declare that those comprehensive and enforceable sanc-
tions imposed on Iraq are simply not working. For sanctions to work and force
Iraq to implement resolutions of the Security Council we need patience. That is
the alternative to a catastrophic and unpredictable military confrontation in an
inflammable region of the world. But it looks like patience is a rare commodity
these days.
44. Schachter, supra note 43 at 462. Schachter notes that only Cuba and Yemen
opposed Resolution 678; their contention was that force could not be used because no
determination had been made that Article 41 sanctions were inadequate. "In their view,
that determination was required when force was authorized under the terms of Article
42." Id. at 455-6. Therefore, Schachter reasons, either Article 42 was not in fact the basis
or, "even if Article 42 was applied, the Council discussion showed that members consid-
ered that the economic sanctions would not be adequate to achieve the withdrawal of
Iraq." Id. at 456.
Schachter's rationalization gives this thesis too much credit. Cuba's and Yemen's
protestations about Article 42 often bordered on the incoherent and, because of their
blatantly political content, do not carry a high indicia of reliability (although this has
nothing to do with those states' right to vote). In particular, Cuba's aversion to Resolu-
tion 665's proposal "to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping" (see Resolution
665 (1990), para. 1, reprinted in THE KUWAIT CRISIs: BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 43, at
117-8), with its implicit reference to Article 42's measures of "blockade and other opera-
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Professor Schachter does express surprise that the Security
Council "did not condemn the invasion as a violation of Article
2(4) and an act of aggression. Clearly, it was both."' 5 However,
,he "would not attribute any legal significance to the omission,"
since the diplomats' statements made during the conferences
and debates leave no doubt that Iraq's actions went well beyond
the pale of any conceivable bounds of legitimacy.46 Moreover,
tions by air, sea, or land forces," is easily interpreted by looking at its recent history.
See, e.g., SJPV.2937, Aug. 18, 1990, id. at 112-13; S/PV.2938, August 25, 1990, id. at 117-
18.
45. Schachter, supra note 43, at 453. Resolution 660 (1990) does generally "condemn
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait," but its specific reference to Article 39 gives rise to Chapter
VII, which is titled: Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace, and Acts of Aggression.
Such reticence is an established feature of United Nations diplomacy, recognized
even by the International Court of Justice. In the Certain Expenses case, Judge Koret-
sky noted of the Congo matter: "If the Security Council in its resolutions did not call the
activity of the Belgian troops an aggression, then this was only for tactical reasons. 'We
have refrained,' said the representative of Tunis. . .'from using the word "aggression" or
even "aggressive acts" in resolutions, since we are most anxious not to exacerbate the
feelings of the Belgian people. . . .' But this cannot change the essence of the matter."
Certain Expenses, 1962 I.C.J. at 276 (diss. op. Koretsky).
Korea is "the one case where the Council has declared the existence of a breach to
the peace" pursuant to Article 39. LELAND M. GOODRICH, EDVARD HAMBRO & ANNE P.
SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 297 (1969), em-
phasis added. The Council came short of calling it "aggression," instead "noting with
grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Ko-
rea." S.C. Res. 82, June 25, 1950. Some commentators reason that, "in this case it was
felt that an attempt to label the 'attack' as an act of aggression might cause undue delay,
in view of the greater seriousness of such a charge." L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A.
SIMONS, supra at 297-8.
46. Schachter, supra note 43, at 453. Canada's delegate stated in no uncertain terms
that "the brutal Iraqi aggression against Kuwait is totally unacceptable and represents a
flagrant violation of international law"; Finland expressed "shock and dismay .... This
act of aggression is a gross violation of the United Nations Charter;" the United King-
dom called it "an unquestionable act of aggression"; and even the Soviet delegation ex-
pressed "its profound concern and alarm," and urged the Security Council to "act imme-
diately to eliminate this violation of international peace and security." S/PV. 2932, Aug.
2, 1990, reprinted in THE KUWAIT CRISIS: BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 43, at 99-102.
Schachter also observes: "In view of the persistence of irredentist claims, the Coun-
cil's unequivocal rejection of Iraq's claim is likely to be recalled in the future. It affirms
that armed force may not be used to change the existing boundary of a state even if that
boundary was established unjustly or by conquest." Schachter, supra note 43, at 454.
This is an important legal development, especially in light of the pending claims of Libya
to a healthy chunk of Chadian territory.
The fact is that Iraq's border dispute with Kuwait is very old. For a discussion of
this matter during the age of the British Empire, see The Historic Background, in THE
KUWAIT CRISIS: BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 43, at 3-72.
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that the Security Council did not point a Dreyfusian finger at
Tariq Aziz and shriek "J'accuse!" was almost certainly a lauda-
ble exercise in hopeful, voluntary self-restraint, premised on the
theory that Iraq would be more easily cajoled into peaceful ne-
gotiation "if it were not expressly condemned for the 'supreme
crime' of aggression. ' 47 The omission may also have made it eas-
ier for Iraq's "brother Arab" nations to agree on the resolutions'
language and to vote for their passage.4 s
According to Schachter, "Resolution 678 may be read as
consistent with both Article 51 and Article 42," 9 although he
leans more toward Article 51.50 Like Weston, Schachter feels it
is significant that the coalition's military forces neither wore the
traditional blue helmets nor carried the U.N. flag.51 Schachter
47. Schachter, supra note 43, at 453. Such finger-pointing and vociferous condemna-
tions are usually reserved for Israel (also known as "the Zionist Entity") in the meetings
of the Special Political Committee.
The "Dreyfusian finger" belonged to Major Henry, who had falsely accused Captain
Dreyfus of espionage. During his testimony at Dreyfus's trial, Henry theatrically pointed
his finger at the defendant and identified him, shrieking "that traitor is sitting there."
DAVID L. LEWIS, PRISONERS OF HONOR: THE DREYFUS AFFAIR 51 (1973).
The bellicose phrase "J'Accuse" derives from the title of the famous essay by the
popular novelist and intellectual Emile Zola, written in response to the acquittal of Es-
terhazy, who was likely the true spy. Zola charged that the acquittal was "a supreme slap
at all truth, all justice!" and then concluded by listing, by name, various government
officials involved in the conspiracy, prefaced with the words "J'Accuse."
48. Schachter, supra note 43, at 453. In his initial address to the Security Council
on August 2, 1990, the Kuwaiti delegate referred to Iraq as "a sisterly country with
which we had previously always enjoyed close links; we have always been linked by our
pure Arab blood, and we have always defended sacred rights and dedicated ourselves to
them." S/PV.2932, Aug. 2, 1990, reprinted in THE KUWAIT CRISIS: BASIC DOCUMENTS,
supra note 43, at 99. The Iraqi delegate also invoked Arab consanguinity (in this case,
referring to Saudi Arabia): "The allegations that Iraq is acting against a brotherly Arab
country are without foundation whatsoever." S/PV.2934, Aug. 9, 1990, id. at 108.
49. Schachter, supra note 43, at 462.
50. Id. at 457.
51. Id. at 459-60. The use of the blue flag during the Korean Conflict was provided
for in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1588, at paragraph 5, concurrently with the flags
of the various nations participating. See supra note 38, and accompanying text. Early in
the Conflict, the U.N. (with considerable ceremony) presented a flag to the U.S. delegate
to be given to General MacArthur, and to be returned to U.N. Headquarters "when no
longer needed for the purpose for which it was sent." U.S. State Dept. doc., U.S. Mission
to the U.N., Telegram No. 33, July 7, 1950, 1p., UNCLASSIFIED, rel. Dec. 3, 1974.
Neither Schachter nor Weston mentions that, during the Korean Conflict, the General
Assembly took the extraordinary step of awarding ribbons and medals to participating
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contends that the lack of baby blue regalia and a formal U.N.
command center "is further evidence that the Security Council
intended to leave the choice of means, timing, command and
control to the participating states.""
Although Schachter does not openly so conclude, his analy-
sis shows that the difference between Resolutions 661 and 678 is
that in 678, the Security Council intended to broaden its options
for the use of force beyond Article 51. By including the whole of
Chapter VII, the Security Council implicitly recognized that Ar-
ticle 42 enforcement actions were not only possible without Arti-
cle 43 agreements, but necessary.
Schachter asks rhetorically why Resolution 678 was re-
quired when the Council had already affirmed, in Resolution
661, the right of collective self-defense." Schachter also ques-
tions why, if the use of force was under Article 51, the Security
Council decided that Resolution 678 was necessary in the first
place. This reasoning would put the cart before the
horse-Article 51 plainly states that one should defend one's self
first, and then report "the exercise of this right of self defense
immediately. . .to the Security Council. '"5 4 As Schachter himself
notes, "collective self-defense action did not require Council ap-
proval or authorization; member states were free anyway to use
force against the aggressor within the limits of self-defense."5
His observation that Resolution 678 "served the political pur-
pose of underlining the general support of the United Nations
for the military measures [and] clarified the objectives of the
collective defense action" 56 does not provide a satisfactory an-
swer. Resolution 678 is much more than a mere highlight.
52. Schachter, supra note 43, at 459-60. Maybe so, but the fact that a "command" is
set up independent of the Security Council hardly means that the action automatically
becomes one of self-defense. Schachter himself points out that, in Article 42 enforcement
actions, the word "'action' does not have to mean that those armed forces are under the
control or command of the Council. That such command and control was contemplated
under other articles of Chapter VII should not be read into Article 42." Id. at 462.
53. Id. at 460. See Resolution 661 (1990) ("Affirming the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter"). Cf. Resolution 678 (1990) ("Acting under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations").
54. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
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Despite his clear penchant for Article 51, Professor
Schachter inadvertently makes his Article 42 argument more
forcefully than he realizes:
Article 42 is the only provision in the Charter that expressly
empowers a UN organ 'to take action by air, sea, or land forces' as
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security. Moreover, Article 39, the 'basic' provision of Chapter
VII, authorizes the Council to 'decide what measures shall be
taken in accordance with Article 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace and security.' A reasonable inference is that if
the Council decides on measures, they should be under either Ar-
ticle 41 (i.e., not involving force) or Article 42 (if military action is
taken) ."
It therefore follows that "if Resolution 678 is a 'measure de-
cided on' by the Council involving armed force, Article 42 would
necessarily apply."58 It seems so simple and forthright. Yet,
Schachter persistently contends, "[t]he argument is not entirely
compelling. '59
To weaken the strength of Article 42's application,
Schachter raises the specter of the Certain Expenses case."
Schachter interprets that decision by the I.C.J. as stating that
the Security Council could employ armed force pursuant to
Charter provisions other than Article 42.61 Specifically,
Schachter suggests "that the Council could act on a liberal con-
struction of its authority. . .to maintain and restore interna-
tional peace and security."62 While it is true that the Charter is
57. Id. at 461.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. at 254 (Advisory Opinion of
July 20, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koretsky). Even Judge Koretsky feared the opinion
would be "used as an instrument of political struggle" and essentially involved "a politi-
cal question" outside the authority of the Court. Id.
Certain Expenses has been criticized by at least one writer as "wallowing in politics
and giving it the name of law." Stanley Hoffman, A World Divided and a World Court
Confused: The World Court's Advisory Opinion on U.N. Financing, in THE PROCESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 137, 150 (Robert S. Wood ed., 1971).
61. Ian Brownlie describes Certain Expenses as an application of the "doctrine of
implied powers." IAN BROWNLIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 690 (1990). This is analo-
gous to Weston's principle of "penumbra of powers...under Chapter VII." See note 42,
supra text.
62. Schachter, supra note 43, at 461.
1993]
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replete with such references, and nobody will deny that Certain
Expenses is hardly a model of clarity,63 Schachter is evading the
fact that the Court's opinion is focused on the practical limita-
tions of applying Article 43. The conclusive language is not
about Article 42 at all, nor does it provide a forum for Article 51
proponents.
E. The U.N. and the I.C.J.
As Schachter avers, the I.C.J. announced from the start that
"the operations known as UNEF and ONUC were not enforce-
ment actions within the compass of Chapter VII" and therefore
Article 43 does not apply."' However, the opinion is about pro-
curing financing for peacekeeping operations, which in the
Congo matter became very confused and very expensive as
United Nations' involvement deepened. It offers no definition of
an "enforcement" action or how it differs in application from
self-defense, nor does it conclusively characterize the United Na-
tions' military operations there.
Despite its preempting caveats, the I.C.J. uses language
which bolsters the argument for Article 42 enforcement actions
as not only existing outside of Article 43 agreements, but being
financed ad hoc. The I.C.J. noted that even if one assumes the
existence of Article 43 agreements, such agreements would not
always apply in every Article 42 action:
The economic problems [of implementing Chapter VII ac-
tions and measures] could not have been covered in advance by a
negotiated agreement since they would be unknown until after
the event and in the case of non-Member States, which are also
included in Article 50, no agreement at all would have been nego-
tiated under Article 43.65
63. See Donald W. McNemar, The Postindependence War in the Congo, in INTER-
NATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR 244-302 (Richard A. Falk ed., 1971).
64. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. at 166 (Advisory Opinion of
July 20, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koretsky). UNEF stands for United Nations
Emergency Force, deployed on peacekeeping activities in the 1956 Suez crisis; ONUC is
the acronym for Operation des Nations Unies au Congo, deployed from 1960-64 on an
initially peacekeeping mission that became increasingly war-like. See CONNAUGHTON,
supra note 29, at 9-10, 51-2.
65. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. at 166-7 (Advisory Opinion
of July 20, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koretsky). Moreover, Article 2, paragraph 6 pro-
vides: "The Organization shall ensure that States which are not Members of the United
[Vol. 5:211
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This is a powerful statement that neither the existence nor
non-existence of Article 43 agreements is grounds for hampering
"measures taken for the maintenance of international peace and
security." ' The full quote supporting this contention (only par-
tially acknowledged by Schachter) states "it cannot be said that
the Charter has left the Security Council impotent in the face of
an emergency situation when agreements under Article 43 have
not been concluded. 67
Thus, Certain Expenses sets forth three premises: first, that
even if Article 43 agreements exist, they are not required to en-
compass everything, since certain facts will not be determined
until after the event; second, Article 43 agreements need not ex-
ist for the Security Council to be able to authorize the use of
force since, if applied stringently to every situation, this would
necessarily exclude non-Member States"S and this is clearly con-
trary to the Charter's intention; third, "in an emergency situa-
tion," the Security Council can do its job even though "agree-
ments under Article 43 have not been concluded."
The biggest problem with Certain Expenses is that it mis-
characterizes the Congo matter and therefore makes it difficult
to define the scope of Article 42 enforcement actions strictly in
terms of the law of the case. As Judge Koretsky in his dissenting
opinion states, there is little question as to what the United Na-
tions Force was doing in the Congo: "The United Nations Force
was sent there, not to persuade or to parade, but to carry out
military operations. And they did so."e
The finding of implied powers not expressly set forth in the
Nations act in accordance with the Principles so far as may be necessary for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security." Article 50 gives non-Member States the right
"to consult the Security Council" in the event its measures cause them economic harm.
See also note 68, infra text.
66. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. at 166-7. Moreover, the lack
of actual Article 43 agreements did not inhibit the U.N. Military Staff Committee from
musing on the overall strength of the armed forces to be made available to the Security
Council. See, e.g., U.N. YEARBOOK 495 (1947-8).
67. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. at 167.
68. In some circumstances, Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter and Rules 37 and 39 of
the Provisional Rules of Procedure provide invitations to non-Members of the Security
Council to participate in the debates, without vote. See DAVIDSON NICOL, THE UNrrED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL: TOWARDS GREATER EPFECTIVENESS 89 (1982).
69. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. at 276 (Advisory Opinion of
July 20, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koretsky).
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Charter is not a novel exercise for the Court. In the Reparation
case,70 the I.C.J. observed that "the rights and duties of an en-
tity such as the Organization [U.N.] must depend upon its pur-
pose and functions as specified or implied in its constituent doc-
uments and developed in practice." 1 Thus, practice is clearly an
important element, and it can be properly asserted that Article
42 actions could develop from practice and necessity-that the
doctrine is in fact evolutionary.
Recent history indicates that Article 42 is evolving into a
doctrine of emergency. If one examines how force was used in
both the Korean Crisis and the Second Gulf Crisis, the element
of emergency clearly predominates. "Emergency" concepts are
traditionally applied to special situations, where one would have
neither the time nor the luxury of making a request to the Se-
curity Council. However, the word does not fall exclusively
within the realm of Article 51 self-defense actions. This emer-
gency doctrine can clearly apply to Article 42, and other Chapter
VII provisions as well. Here, "emergency" means a threat to the
peace and security where the immediate situation is such that
the Council can meet, deliberate, and make determinations, but
even with the passage of time, the situation remains dire.
The key point is that the I.C.J. recognizes the need for flexi-
bility now, and is willing to give the Organization a free hand in
taking actions on an emergency basis-not only where there are
no Article 43 agreements, but even in the case where such an
existing agreement would prove inadequate or inapplicable. The
Court will not restrain the Security Council from actions that it
must undertake in order to maintain international peace and se-
curity. Law is a mighty thing, the I.C.J. averred, and necessity is
70. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J.
174 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 11). Rostow observes: "The actions of the Secretary-Gen-
eral and his 'private army' in that case became highly controversial, and in the end the
Soviet Union and France refused for a long time to pay their shares of the costs of the
operation as a protest." Rostow, supra note 29, at 508. However, the Advisory Opinions
of the International Court of Justice make their duties in this regard clear. Rostow ne-
glected to say that these Member States also refused to pay their share of the upkeep of
the United Nations Memorial Cemetery in Korea. See Elisabeth Zoller, The "Corporate
Will" of the United Nations and the Rights of the Minority, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 610, 620
(1987).
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even mightier. This, the Reparation court held, is not just good
advice, but a matter of international law. "Under international
law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers
which, though not expressly provided in its Charter, are con-
ferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the
performance of its duties.""2 In the case of Article 42, all the
powers needed are in fact set forth in the Charter.
F. Michael Glennon: Resolution 678
Although he does not specifically tackle the issue of Resolu-
tion 678's Charter basis, Michael Glennon takes something of a
giant step and calls the whole of Chapter VII "a dead letter." s
Taking a firm anti-internationalist stance, Glennon hurls a pox
at both articles, insisting that no matter what the basis of Reso-
lution 678's is, the President of the U.S. had no right to intro-
duce U.S. armed forces into the Second Gulf Crisis without Con-
gressional authorization.74
A strict constructionist, Glennon's fixation on the "permis-
sive" and "nonobligatory" character of Resolution 678 inexora-
bly leads him to conclude that, "[u]nder the Charter, a permis-
sive Security Council decision imposes no obligation on a
member state to 'carry out' a decision under Article 25 or Article
48. 175
II. THE LEGALITY OF A MAJORITY OF ONE"
Much attention has been focused on the fact that the major-
ity of the U.N. coalition's forces in the Second Gulf Crisis were
American, and that the coalition itself was formed, prodded, and
led into battle predominantly by the United States."" However,
72. Id. at 178.
73. Glennon, supra note 11, at 87, n.71 (1991). See Weston, supra note 33, at 519:
"Article 42 had become, it is widely agreed, a dead letter".
74. Glennon, supra note 11, at 88, n.75.
75. Id. at 75.
76. "Any man more right than his neighbors constitutes a majority of one." HENRY
DAVID THOREAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1849).
77. That the Soviet Union (such as it still existed at the time) did not contribute
any military forces to the coalition should surprise no one: "[Tihe combination of incipi-
ent civil war at home and popular revulsion against eight years of war in Afghanistan
imposed severe restraints on Gorbachev." Alvin Z. Rubinstein, New World Order or
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American leadership coming to the forefront in international
conflicts is nothing new.
North Americans played a prominent military role in inter-
national conflicts from the late seventeenth century onwards. At
least four European wars were partially fought in continental
North America by various colonial powers before American inde-
pendence: War of the League of Augsberg, 1689-97; War of the
Spanish Succession, 1702-13; War of the Austrian Succession,
1740-48; and the Seven Years War (known as "the French and
Indian War"), 1756-63. By the eighteenth century, Americans
had ample experience with the employment of military force as
a valuable tool in imperial expansion, which they soon used to
pursue American manifest destiny in their own spheres of influ-
ence."' These conflicts, however, did not reflect the "rescue oper-
ation" philosophy that eventually became the predominant fea-
ture of American military involvement in foreign affairs.7 9
History shows that real multinational coalitions are hard to
come by. Neither World War I nor World War II presented a
true model of either coordination or cooperation on the part of
Allied forces. In both World Wars, the U.S. initially held back
from entering offshore hostilities until matters reached a crisis,
Hollow Victory? 70, 4 FOREIGN AFF. 53, 57 (Fall, 1991).
78. "We consider the interests of Cuba, Mexico and ours as the same," Jefferson
wrote to William C. C. Claiborne in 1808, "and that the object of both must be to ex-
clude all European influence from this hemisphere." Robert W. Tucker & David C. Hen-
drickson, Thomas Jefferson and American Foreign Policy, 62, 2 FOREIGN AFF. 135
(Spring, 1990).
Although Jefferson. aspired to accomplish this without resort to force, other Presi-
dents were not so reticent-especially Teddy Roosevelt: "'I have been hoping and work-
ing ardently,' Roosevelt admitted, 'to bring about our interference in Cuba.'" WILLIAM A.
WILLIAMS, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 34 (1962).
79. Americans, writes Spanier, are used to fighting not on the basis of a set of "ab-
stemious rules," but prefer to engage in conflicts that "can be converted into moral cru-
sades for righteous causes." JOHN W. SPANIER, THE TRUMAN-MAcARTHUR CONTROVERSY
AND THE KOREAN WAR 4 (1965). Basically, Spanier contends, Americans view power as
"sinful" and believe that international conflicts stem from the actions of "undemocratic
political systems," "wicked (i.e. undemocratic) statesmen", and "totalitarian tyrants." Id.
at 4-5. The United States justifies using force because it claims it has been "provoked
into violence by despots." Id. at 5. It rationalizes its acts in terms of "universal" princi-
ples. This "crusade" consciousness rocked America's foreign policy, pendulum between
extremes of "total war or total isolation. What it did not allow was a practical and con-
sistent participation in world politics." JOHN STOESSINGER, CRUSADERS AND PRAGMATISTS:
MOVERS OF THE MODERN AMERICAN FOREIGN "POLICY 7 (1985).
[Vol. 5:211
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and other belligerent nations had fought themselves literally
into a state of exhaustion and decimation."° In World War I, the
Allies did not even begin to cooperate with one another until the
U.S. finally entered the hostilities in 1917.81 Up to that time,
each state had waged a separate war against a common enemy
towards a common end, and each was being crushed seriatim."
Before entry by the United States, whatever actual coordination
of military forces there was between the Allies had only resulted
in entrenched stalemates, if not outright failure. Of the million
combatants in the last great battle of World War I, 896,000 were
Americans."s
Although World War II eventually came to be conducted
with unique cooperation and combined strategy, the idea of a
unified command was more illusion than actual fact. In 1941, af-
ter a long flirtation with neutrality,84 Congress finally declared
80. Ironically, President Wilson won the Democrats' renomination in 1916 under the
slogan, "He kept us out of the war," all the while beefing up the army and reserve forces
in preparation to join the Allied war effort. The Democrats' official campaign platform,
"Peace and Prosperity," was only slightly less incongruous. ROBERT H. FERRELL, WOOD-
ROW WILSON & WORLD WAR I, 1917-1921, 1 (1985). Although Wilson lacked a popular
mandate, the election made clear that most Americans wanted to stay out of the war.
Nevertheless, five months later, Wilson declared that "the right is more precious than
peace" when it meant fighting "for democracy," and Congress declared war on Germany.
Id. at 2-3. See also JAMES G. HARBORD, THE AMERICAN ARMY IN FRANCE. 1917-1919, 17-32
(1936).
81. The first U.S. troops reached France on January 26, 1917. "Lafayette," said U.S.
Army Colonel Charles E. Stanton, during a July 4th ceremony at the patriot's tomb, "we
are here." See DONALD SMYTHE, PERSHING: GENERAL OF THE ARMIES, 33-4 (1986). Some
historians have erroneously credited General Pershing with coining this profundity. See
Robert M. McAllister, Pershing Didn't Say It, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1988, at A30.
82. On September 5, 1914, Russia, France and Great Britain had concluded the
Treaty of London, in which each pledged not to make a separate peace with the Central
Powers. Following the Russian Revolution, the Bolsheviks abrogated their treaty obliga-
tions and made a separate peace with Germany in March, 1918. HARBORD, supra note 80,
at 242-62.
83. FERRELL, supra note 80, at 81.
84. Exhausted by World War I, most Americans were in no hurry to jump back
across the pond. "As long as Europe plans for war," Walter Lippman wrote in 1934,
"America must plan for neutrality." Even so, the United States eventually moved from
the 1935 Neutrality Act and a steadfast policy of noninterventionism through 1938, to a
declaration of "limited national emergency" in 1939. In 1940, President Roosevelt an-
nounced a policy shift from neutrality to "non-belligerency." After winning reelection to
an unprecedented third term, Roosevelt, chatting by his fireside, told his radio audience
that the United States would serve as the allies' "arsenal of democracy." Speech of Dec.
29, 1940, printed in FRANKLIN DELANOR ROOSEVELT, My FRIENDS-TWENTY-EIGHT His-
19931
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war on Japan after that nation bombed the U.S. naval base at
Pearl Harbor."5 Once the U.S. was in the war, attempts were
made to set up a unified central command in the Southwest Pa-
cific, coordinating American, British, Dutch and Australian
forces to oppose the Japanese offensive advance into the Nether-
lands, East Indies and Malaysia."6 Although several unified
World War II Allied Commands were set up in Europe, the
Mediterranean, the Pacific, and South-East Asia, Americans
consistently played a dominant and often singular role.
A. The Korean Conflict
The mere mention of the U.N. Command in the Korean
Conflict, as an example of an international coalition force, makes
many scholars blush with embarrassment.8 7 Although eventually
TORY-MAKING SPEECHES (Edward H. Kavinoky & Julian Park eds., 1945), 67-75 at 75.
Like Wilson before him, however, Roosevelt was gearing up the United States to
enter the war. Hence, his disparagement of negotiating "a dictator's peace": "Those who
would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither lib-
erty nor safety." Message to Congress of Jan. 6, 1941, id. at 76-83, 78. Nevertheless,
Hitler was "convinced that North America would never again take part in a European
war. Undoubtedly, isolationism contributed to this delusion." DESMOND SEWARD, NAPO-
LEON AND HITLER: A COMPARATIVE BIOGRAPHY 144 (1988). Saddam Hussein's certainty
that America could not accept high battle casualties-"10,000 dead in an afternoon," as
Iraq had suffered in its war with Iran-has a strikingly similar ring. Excerpts From Iraqi
Document on Meeting With U.S. Envoy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1990, at A19. See also
H.D.S. Greenway, It was Bush's Call, BOSTON GLOBE, May 10, 1991, at 17.
85. December 7, 1941, "a day which will live in infamy," was an especially busy day
for the Japanese, who simultaneously bombed Guam, Wake Island, Midway Island, the
Philippines, Hong Kong and Singapore, as well as Pearl Harbor, all within a twenty-four
hour period, inflicting serious casualties and military hardware losses, as well as a crip-
pling loss of American confidence. Although historians debate whether Roosevelt "knew"
that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor, and intended to use this as grounds to
enter the war, there is no doubt that the American military and the Executive Branch
were surprised and horrified by the devastation, and astonished by Japan's ability to
strike from such a distance. See generally MICHAEL SLACKMAN, TARGET: PEARL HARBOR
(1990), see also JOHN TOLAND, INFAMY: PEARL HARBOR AND ITS AFTERMATH (1982).
Hoping to unravel the mysteries of the Japanese war machine, the U.S. government
enlisted the aid of anthropologists such as Ruth Benedict, author of THE CHRYSANTHE-
MUM AND THE SWORD (1946), to explain Japan's Samurai warrior tradition of military
obligation, obeisance, and complete sacrifice.
86. This did not reflect American concern for upholding democratic institutions and
values; it served to protect established colonial presences against Japan's efforts to fur-
ther its own manifest destiny. See JOHN COSTELLO, THE PACIFIC WAR 180-97, 202-210
(1981).
87. Of course, everybody knows that the Korean Conflict was fought mostly by
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forces from sixteen Member States fought alongside each other,
most of the troops were Americans. They were led by an Ameri-
can, General Douglas MacArthur, who was later relieved of his
command not by the Security Council, but by U.S. President
Harry Truman." Furthermore, all the support staff was Ameri-
can and virtually all military strategy was decided by the United
States." The United States paid for practically the entire opera-
tion, including subsidizing the coalition forces with munitions
and supplies. All this was accomplished pursuant to valid Secur-
ity Council and General Assembly resolutions, proposed,
drafted, and promoted largely by the United States. Neverthe-
less, it was officially considered a U.N. operation, and was con-
ducted under Security Council supervision; the coalition troops
flew the U.N. flag and wore its insignia. The Security Council
received reports from the U.N. Command outlining the progress
of the military operation, and even issued medals to
combatants."'
Although the circumstantial evidence is daunting, it is too
easy to conclude that the Korean Conflict is just another exam-
ple of the U.S. unilaterally throwing its weight around."1 Presi-
dent Truman felt that if the United States "had not persuaded
the U.N. to back up the free Republic of Korea, Western Europe
would have gone into the hands of the Communists."" Never-
Americans, because one never sees forces of any other nationality on M*A*S*H*.
88. "I fired him because he wouldn't respect the authority of the President. That's
the answer to that," said Truman. "I didn't fire him because he was a dumb son of a
bitch, although he was, but that's not against the law for generals. If it was, half to three-
quarters of them would be in jail." Harry S. Truman, quoted in MERLE MILLER, PLAIN
SPEAKING 287 (1974). See also BURTON I. KAUFMAN, The Recall and the MacArthur
Hearings, in THE KOREAN WAR: CHALLENGES IN CRISIS, CREDIBILITY, AND COMMAND 144-82
(1986).
89. See JAMES BARROS, TRYOvE LIE AND THE COLD WAR: THE UN SECRETARY GEN-
ERAL PURSUES PEACE, 1946-1953 278-311 (1989).
90. Id. at 280. See also note 51, supra. Scholars have noted the "striking" unanimity
of the Truman administration and the U.S. State Department, as summarized by then-
Ambassador Philip C. Jessup: "We've got to do something, and whatever we do, we've
got to do it through the United Nations." STOESSINGER, supra note 79, at 72 (footnote
omitted).
91. But see IF. STONE, THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE KOREAN WAR 1950-1951 (1952)
(suggesting that the Korean Conflict was the product of a pre-Cold War intervention
conspiracy).
92. HARRY S. TRUMAN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN (1980). For Tru-
man, the President who let the atomic genie out of the bottle, there was no turning away
1993]
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theless, the truth is that the Korean Conflict comes very close to
representing a Chapter VII enforcement action of a multina-
tional nature. Given the extreme bipolarity of global politics in
1950, it probably comes closer than anything that could have
been imagined then. Certainly, Truman had no doubts about the
nature of the action he undertook. Truman stated, "It]his was a
police action, a limited war, whatever you want to call it to stop
aggression and to prevent a big war. And that's all it ever was."' 3
However, one must look at the whole picture, and not simply at
the structure of the command, to see how truly international the
Korean Conflict was.
from North Korean aggression: "I wasn't going to let this attack on the Republic of Ko-
rea. . .go forward. Because if it wasn't stopped, it would lead to a third world war, and I
wasn't going to let that happen. Not while I was President." Harry S. Truman, quoted in
MILLER, supra note 88, at 274; cf., CIA Report, Oct. 12, 1950, 4 p., TOP SECRET, de-
class. May 7, 1979, TRUMAN LIBRARY, PRESIDENT'S SECRETARY'S FILE, KOREAN WAR FILE.
This intelligence report, issued early in the Conflict, concluded that there were "no con-
vincing indications" of overt Chinese intervention and, barring a Soviet decision to en-
gage in "global war," no outside intervention was expected in 1950. Id. This changed
dramatically in less than a month, when a National Security Council report warned that
the United States "should make its preparations on the basis that the risk of global war
is increased." N.S.C. doc., A Report to the President by the National Security Council,
NSC 81/1, Sept. 9, 1950, 9 p., TOP SECRET, declass. Apr. 24, 1975.
Others contend that Truman's quick response was to counter charges of earlier
"malfeasance in the Far East"-specifically, the fall of Nationalist China. Thomas F.
Roeser, Harry Truman: Man v. Myth, CHIC. TRIB., Oct. 9, 1992, at C23. See also Dept. of
Defense doc., CAPT. WILBER W. HOARE, JR. USAR, IV THE KOREAN CONFLICT: II THE
WEEK OF DECISION, 25 JUNE-30 JUNE 1950 (Jan. 1953), at Sec. VI; 17 p., TOP SECRET,
declass. Mar. 4, 1977.
93. MILLER, supra note 88, at 274. By "a big war," Truman meant "a third World
War between Communist and non-Communist states." STOESSINGER, supra note 79, at
73. Rostow disputes this, calling the Korean Conflict "a mission of collective self-defense
under American direction." Rostow, supra note 29, at 508. However, it is difficult to
reconcile Rostow's self-defense contentions with the movements of the United Nations
field forces, which were on the offensive for the most part and chased the North Koreans
back, beyond the 38th Parallel and eventually to the Yalu River. Even when the action
first commenced, it was not a defensive action; the North Koreans had not merely in-
vaded the south, they had destroyed its army and set up shop in its capital. This being
America, Rostow is free to say what he likes, but the facts do not bear him out. Part of
the confusion over the nature of the Korean Conflict may arise from Truman's early
disclaimer that the U.S. was "not at war," but involved in "a police action" that was also
a "combat operation." Anthony Leviero, U.S. "Not at War," President Asserts; Calls
Operation Police Action for U.N. on "Bandits," N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1950, at Al. Of
course, technically under the U.N. Charter, Truman was correct, since the Charter effec-
tively outlaws "war" in the classical sense. See supra text notes 16-21, and accompanying
text.
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1. The Division
Historians differ on interpreting the 1943 division of Korea,
but it is likely that the U.S.' strategy was merely to halt the
Soviets' southern advance.9 Immediately after the bombing of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Stalin declared war on Japan; Soviet
troops fanned out across Manchuria and landed on the northern
tip of Korea.95 Following Japan's official surrender, the U.S.
drafted General Order No. 1, setting forth the terms of Japan's
surrender in Korea." In effect, this Order divided Korea at the
38th Parallel;97 Japanese forces to the north surrendered to the
Soviet Union, and those to the south surrendered to the United
States.9 Stalin raised no objections, but just as Berlin was di-
vided, he ordered the 38th Parallel sealed off.
In September of 1946, the U.S. brought the issue of Korean
reunification before the U.N. General Assembly, which adopted
a U.S.-drafted resolution. The resolution called for general elec-
tions to be held under the observation of a U.N. Temporary
Commission on Korea. 9 Those Koreans elected would thereby
form a National Assembly, establish a government, and make ar-
rangements with both military powers for the withdrawal of for-
eign troops.1°°
Whereas the South held U.N.-supervised elections and its
U.S. military government came to an end, the Soviets refused to
allow the Temporary Commission into North Korea. 0 1 Instead,
the Soviets set up a Communist puppet regime, and on October
12, 1948 the Soviet Union recognized the (Northern) Democratic
People's Republic of Korea as the only lawful government. Con-
94. RICHARD WHELAN, DRAWING THE LINE: THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953, 31-2 (1990).
95. Id. at 24-35. See also, ERIK VAN REE, SOCIALISM IN ONE ZONE: STALIN'S POLICY IN
KOREA, 1945-1947, 58-69 (1989).
96. WHELAN, supra note 94, at 30, citing U.S. Dept. of State, VI Foreign Relations
of the United States: Diplomatic Papers 659 (1945).
97. BRUCE CUMMINGS, THE ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN WAR: LIBERATION AND THE EMER-
GENCE OF SEPARATE REGIMES, 1945-1947 120-2 (1981).
98. See WHELAN, supra note 94, at 29. See also BARROS, supra note 89, at 273; Rich-
ard J.H. Johnston, Division of Korea Started in 1945 as Part of a War Plan to Beat
Japan, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1950, at AS.
99. LEON GORDENKER, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF Ko-
REA: THE POLITICS OF FIELD OPERATION, 1947-1950 13-48 (1959).
100. Id.
101. See BARROS, supra note 89, at 273-4.
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versely, exactly two months later, the U.N. General Assembly
solemnly declared that the (Southern) Republic of Korea was
the only lawful government.102
When the North Koreans attacked on June 25, 1950, at 4:00
A.M. Korean time, 'both South Korea and the U.S. were caught
completely unprepared 03 The U.S. had considered an attack
from the northern regime to be so unlikely that it did not even
have an emergency alert system in place. The Truman Adminis-
tration first heard of the attack "not from the military personnel
or foreign service officers in Korea, but from the U.S. press news
service."'1 4 Relying more on a faulty vision of a "total" war 0 5
with the Soviet Union, the U.S. had decided that "in the event
of war American troops stationed in Korea would constitute a
military liability, since they could not be maintained on the pe-
ninsula without substantial reinforcements prior to the at-
tack."'0 6 Moreover, the Truman Administration had deliberately
102. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE PUBLICATION 5609, THE KOREAN PROBLEM AT THE GENEVA
CONFERENCE, APRIL 26 - JUNE 15, 1954, at 2.
103. DAVID REES, KOREA: THE LIMITED WAR 3-7, 13 (1964); Robert F. Whitney, Cap-
itol in Dispute on Korean Attack: Washington Arguing Whether Administration was
Taken by Surprise by Blow, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1950, at A3. But see Hanson W. Bald-
win, Blocking the Red Conquest Program: U.S. Decision to Aid South Korea With
Armed Forces May Have Curbed Pattern Set For the Summer Months, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 1950, at A12. Hanson reported that, in early June, C.I.A. reports (circulated to
Truman and others) detailed "a marked build-up by the North Korean People's Army
along the Thirty-Eighth Parallel" and "noticeable" deployment of tanks, field guns, and
other heavy equipment along the "bloody border." Id. Ironically, only the day before,
U.N. field observers had returned from a fact-finding mission to the 38th Parallel, and
had issued a report denoting that the South Korean forces were wholly defensive and "in
no condition to carry out a large-scale attack against North Korean forces." SPANIER,
supra note 79, at 15. The U.S. State Department speedily confirmed that South Korea
faced an "all-out offensive" invasion from the North (U.S. State Dept. doc., U.S. Em-
bassy, Seoul, Telegram No. 925, June 25, 1950, 1p., CONFIDENTIAL, declass. June 7,
1974), and that North Korea not only had "complete air superiority," but was strafing
the capitol. U.S. State Dept. doc., U.S. Embassy, Seoul, Telegram No. 935, June 25,
1950, 1 p., Secret, declass. June 7, 1974.
Perversely, the Soviets claimed that South Korea had initiated the hostilities. See
Tass Has Reverse News; Says South Invaded North, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1950, at A3.
104. SPANIER, supra note 79, at 21.
105. "The objective of total war is the complete destruction or surrender of the en-
emy's military forces and the overthrow of his government-the enemy's unconditional
surrender." Id. at 4.
106. SPANIER, supra note 79, at 16. See also White House Memo, Dec. 30, 1952, 2 p.,
TOP SECRET, declass. Jan. 16, 1987 [part. illeg.]. This memo notes that in June 1949,
the U.S. had 8,000 troops stationed in Korea "as the living guarantee that if the North
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol5/iss1/7
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withheld most heavy weapons from South Korea, on the grounds
that it would only encourage them to carry out their frequent
threats to forcibly reunify the country.10
7
On June 26, 1950 the U.N. Security Council, abetted by the
U.S. and in the absence of the Soviet delegate, adopted Resolu-
tion 82.108 Similar in content to Resolution 660 of the Second
Koreans invaded they would be automatically at war with the United States." Id. These
troops were withdrawn, pursuant to Secretary of State Dean Acheson's statement that
South Korea lay "outside the 'American defense perimeter." Id. According to the White
House memo, the rationale for the withdrawal was based on a flawed understanding of a
report by Gen. MacArthur, who had actually recommended that U.S. forces be kept in
place in South Korea. Id.
107. See REES, supra note 103, at 16; Walter Sullivan, Soviet, U.S. Models for Ko-
rean Armies, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1950, at A3. Truman's "less is more" policy led to
scathing criticism from the Senate's more colorful members: "American boys are dying in
Korea" because "a group of untouchables in the State Department sabotaged" the aid
program that Congress had voted for Korea, claimed Senator Joseph R. McCarthy.
M'Carthy Assails Acheson on Korea, Says State Dept. Group "Sabotaged" Program of
Aid Enacted by Congress, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1950, at A2. McCarthy complained that all
the South Koreans had received from the money Congress had voted them for arms was
"about $52,000 worth of baling wire." Id. Although McCarthy was a notorious extremist
and demagogue, his remarks about "American boys" dying abroad struck a chord with
the American public, coming the same day that the first list of U.S. casualties in Korea
was released by the U.S. Army. First Casualties in Korea, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1950, at
A2.
108. Unanimity on the final vote was marred by only one abstention-Yugoslavia.
A.M. Rosenthal, Security Council Acts Swiftly at U.S. Call to End Hostilities: Vote 9-0,
Russia Absent, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1950, at Al. See also STOESSINGER, supra note 79, at
74. Throughout the Korean Conflict, Yugoslavia successfully bartered its votes between
the U.S. and U.S:S.R. delegations. See C.L. Sulzberger, Tito Due to get Marshall Plan
Flour in Emergency Step Against Famine, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1950, at Al; C.L.
Sulzberger, Tito Says He'll Back U.N. Decision in Event of Conflict With Red China,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1950, at Al. But the United States resisted being completely merce-
nary. India, which had bitterly resisted branding China as an "aggressor" when that
country attacked U.N. forces, received $180,000,000 in U.S. aid "to demonstrate...the
humanitarian nature of American foreign policy." W.H. Lawrence, Truman Will Urge
Grain Gift to India; Plans 2,000,000-Ton Request to Congress to Avert Famine-No
Strings Attached, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1951, at Al. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker
would have done well to remember Truman's lesson of largess during the Second Gulf
Crisis. See infra note 145, and accompanying text.
Stoessinger claims that some delegates "actually risked their political futures by de-
ciding to vote in the absence of instructions from their governments." Stoessinger, supra
note 79, at 74. But few diplomats took North Korea's attack on South Korea more per-
sonally than Then-Secretary-General Trygve Lie, who called it "an affront to the United
Nations more than to anyone else, since the United Nations had been . . . largely re-
sponsible for the formation of the Republic." TRYGVE LIE, IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE 329
(1954).
On the absence of the Soviet delegate, see BARROS, supra note 89, at 276. The Soviet
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Gulf Crisis, Resolution 82 declared the invasion of South Korea
to be "a breach of the peace," and called for North Korea's im-
mediate withdrawal. 10 9 This resolution was predictably ignored.
The same day, President Truman ordered the U.S. Navy and
Air Force to render assistance to the South Koreans. 110 Catching
up with Truman on June 27, the Security Council adopted Reso-
lution 83. Framed and proposed by the United States, Resolu-
tion 83 "recommend[ed]" that Member States furnish to South
Korea such assistance as necessary "to repel the armed attack
and restore internal peace and security in the area." 1 ' This ena-
bled Truman to bring in U.S. troops under U.N. auspices."'
Had Truman simply acted on his own, and not immediately
raised the matter with the Security Council, he could still have
invoked Article 51 to justify his initial actions. Although the
U.S. had no defense treaty or pact with South Korea, that na-
tion was indeed a U.S. "friend" with practically de facto status
as a protectorate. However, the decisive defeat of the South Ko-
rean Army and capture of the capital by the North Koreans not
only changed the character of any possible response, but indi-
Union subsequently challenged the Security Council's action on two grounds-lack of
concurring votes of all permanent members pursuant to U.N. Charter Article 27, and
failure to seat a "Chinese Communist Government" delegation. Soviet Criticism of U.N.
Action is Rejected; U.S. Cites Precedents for Korea Decision, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1950,
at A2. The U.S. State Department rejected these contentions, averring that "prior to the
Soviet allegations, every member of the United Nations, including the U.S.S.R., accepted
as legal and binding decisions of the Security Council made without the concurrence, as
expressed through an affirmative vote, of all permanent members." Id.
109. U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 473 mtg., at 7, 13-4 U.N. Doc. 8/1501 (1950). Text
printed in N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1950, at A4. See also text of U.S. Statement by U.S.
delegate Ernest A. Gross, printed in N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1950, at A4.
110. Austin Stevens, U.S. Rushing Arms to South Koreans: Quantities to "Shift
Balance" Being Sent by MacArthur Under Air, Naval Escort, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
1950, at Al. Congress also acted swiftly, approving "the prompt submission of the dis-
pute by the United States to the United Nations Security Council" and "applaud[ing]
Truman's "arms aid." Clayton Knowles, Congressmen Back Moves Made by U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 1950, at Al. See also U.S. Embassy, Moscow, Telegram no. 1726, Pass
USUN, June 25, 1950, 2 p., TOP SECRET, declass. Nov. 11, 1975, TRUMAN LIBRARY,
GEORGE M. ELSEY PAPERS.
111. U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 474 mtg., at 4, U.N. Doc. 8/1511 (1950).
112. Letter from John D. Hickerson, for the Secy. of State, to Warren A. Austin,
U.S. Rep. to the U.N., June 30, 1950, 2 p., UNCLASSIFIED, released Dec. 3, 1974. For a
detailed account of the conflict between Trygve Lie and the U.S. Government on the role
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cated to all that a concerted military effort would be required to
dislodge the captors. Moreover, the U.N. had been effectively
overseeing the Korean political situation since the Japanese sur-
render, and already had established its role; the very survival of
the U.N. depended upon a military response. 113 Also, President
Truman himself wanted to frame the U.S. response in the na-
ture of an enforcement action. When he announced that he was
sending U.S. forces to Korea, he was careful to note why: "A
return to the rule of force in international affairs would have
far-reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold
the rule of law."1" " Implicit in Truman's promise to "uphold the
rule of law" was the reciprocal promise to be bound by it.
Matters took a quick and dangerous turn when, on June 28,
the North Koreans captured Seoul, the southern capital.'1 5 Tru-
man immediately ordered U.S. ground forces into Korea, where
they first saw battle on July 4.116 A third Resolution, this time
passed by the General Assembly, recommended "that all mem-
bers providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to
the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and
other assistance available to a unified command under the
113. BARROS, supra note 89, at 274. From the start, the U.N. insisted "that the
fighting there was assuming the character of full-scale war and might endanger interna-
tional peace and security." U.N. Unit in Korea Warns on Fighting: Message to Lie Says
Outbreak May Endanger "International Peace and Security," N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
1950, at A5. See also texts of U.N. Commission in Korea Communique and Radio State-
ment, both printed in N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1950, at A5. The journalistic record points
unequivocally to Article 42, rather than Article 51. As General Omar Bradley realized,
the invasion was "the test of all the talk of the last five years of collective security."
Quoted in STOESSINGER, supra note 79, at 75.
114. Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea, June 27, 1950, 1950
PUB. PAPERS: HARRY S. TRUMAN 492, cited in Franck & Patel, supra note 8, at 70; text
printed in N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1950, at Al. See Anthony Leviero, Truman Orders U.S.
Air, Navy Units to Fight in Aid of Korea; U.N. Council Supports Him, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 1950, at Al. See also REES, supra note 103, at 24.
115. See JOHN W. RILEY, JR. & WILBUR SCHRAMM, THE REDS TAKE A CITY: THE COM-
MUNIST OCCUPATION OF SEOUL (Hugh Heung-wu Cynn trans., 1951); M'Arthur Flies to
Base in Korea as Seoul Falls, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1950, at Al; North Korean Tanks
Enter Seoul; South Moves its Capitol 20 Miles, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1950, at Al.
116. See Lindesay Parrott, U.S. Troops Check North Koreans in Fierce Battle
South of Suwon, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1950, at Al; U.S. Troops Shell North Koreans;
Suwon Captured by the Invaders, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1950, at Al; Harold B. Hinton,
U.S. Troops Land in South Korea, North Bombed on Truman Order; President Autho-
rizes Air Force to Strike North of 38th Parallel, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1950, at Al.
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United States."11 Most of the initial troops were supplied by
U.S. occupation forces stationed in Japan.118 Although sixteen
Member States sent contingents, most of the air units, naval
forces, supplies and money for the operation came from the
United States. "
117. U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 25, U.N. Doc. A/1361 (1950). See
Thomas J. Hamilton, Most U.N. Delegates Favor Use of Land Force in Korea, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 1950, at Al. Other Member States quickly followed suit. A.M. Rosenthal,
33 Countries Back Security Council; List of Nations Approving U.N. Action on Korea
Still Rising-Military Aid Pledged, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1950, at A3. By July 7, this num-
ber had increased to forty-four (out of fifty-nine). Thomas J. Hamilton, U.N. Charter
Cited to Refute Russian Charges Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1950, at A4.
118. U.S. Troops Moving to Battle Front; Reinforcements Leave Japan by Sea,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1950, at Al; U.S. Troops Are Alerted, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1950, at
A2.
119. REES, supra note 103. According to Rees, President Truman was at first reluc-
tant to enter into a military action which held the potential for a confrontation with the
Soviet Union. Id. at 26. However, a firm U.S. commitment to fight North Korea was
immediately made. See Lindesay Parrott, MacArthur Assures Aid to Korea; Ten Mus-
tangs Transferred to Seoul, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1950, at Al; C.P. Trussell, War Spurs
Senate to Speed up Arms Aid, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1950, at Al. The U.S. also lobbied
hard for international support. U.S. Tells Envoys of Move in Korea; State Dept. Ex-
plains Necessity for Action There-Response Enthusiastic, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1950,
at A3.
As with the Second Gulf Crisis, concurring Member States responded at various
levels of participation, and even these levels changed in greater and lesser degree for the
duration of the Conflict. See infra text at note 154. In the first days of the U.N. decision,
Britain literally turned its fleet around and headed to South Korea to assist in the U.N.'s
naval blockade. British Send Fleet to Aid U.S. Forces; Australia and New Zealand Also
Place Ships in Area Under M'Arthur Command, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1950, at Al. Por-
tugal and Peru offered "full support." U.S. State Dept. doc., U.S. Embassy, Lisbon, Tele-
gram No. 7, July 5, 1950, 1 p., SECRET, declass. Dec. 3, 1974; U.S. State Dept. doc., U.S.
Embassy, Lima, Telegram No. 5, July 3, 1950, 1 p., CONFIDENTIAL, declass Nov. 21,
1974. Australia gave naval and air assistance. U.S. State Dept. doc., Outgoing Telegram
No. 1 to U.S. Embassy, Canberra, July 3, 1950, 1 p., CONFIDENTIAL, declass. Dec. 3,
1974. France sent a naval vessel (although the U.S. had hoped for more from its former
ally) [U.S. State Dept. doc., U.S. Embassy, Paris, Telegram No. 29, July 3, 1950, 1 p.,
SECRET, declass. Dec. 3, 1974], as did Canada. U.S. State Dept. doc., U.S. Embassy,
Ottowa, Telegram No. 3, July 5, 1950, 1 p., SECRET, declass. Dec. 3, 1974. Greece prom-
ised to participate in a "trade blockade." U.S. State Dept. doc., U.S. Embassy, Athens,
Telegram No. 73, July 7, 1950, 1 p., UNCLASSIFIED, rel. Dec. 3, 1974. Nicaragua of-
fered food and "raw material aid," and promised to supply troops "if necessary." U.S.
State Dept. doc., U.S. Embassy, Managua, Dispatch No. 15, July 5, 1950, 1 p., CONFI-
DENTIAL, declass. Dec. 3, 1974.
Some responses were rather creative. Bolivia tendered the talents of its best and
brightest-"military officers." U.S. State Dept. doc., Outgoing Telegram No. 4 to U.S.
Embassy, La Paz, July 6, 1950, 1 p., CONFIDENTIAL, declass. Nov. 21, 1974. Chile
offered to supply raw materials and, curiously, to "counteract Communist opposition."
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At first the U.N. Command forces arriving in Korea were
forced to retreat, as the North Koreans cofitinued to advance. 120
The tide finally turned against the North after MacArthur's bril-
liant amphibious attack at Inchon, and the North was suddenly
"on the run."'' It is here, in the flush of victory, that the rosy
issues of power and authority in Article 42 enforcement actions
truly sprout their thorns. On September 27, 1950, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff ordered MacArthur to "destroy" the North Ko-
rean forces. 22 Two days later U.S. President Truman, presuma-
bly on the basis of his authority as Commander-In-Chief of the
U.S. troops (and without so much as a nod to the U.N. Military
Staff Committee), authorized MacArthur to cross the line into
North Korea. 23 With all the appearance of being an after-
U.S. State Dept. doc., U.S. Embassy, Santiago, Telegram No. 1, July 3, 1950, 1 p., CON-
FIDENTIAL, declass. Dec. 3, 1974. Haiti gave its "moral support." U.S. State Embassy,
Port au Prince, Telegram No. 5, July 3, 1950, 1 p., CONFIDENTIAL, declass. Nov. 21,
1974. Even States that did not wish to become directly embroiled made some sort of
meaningful gesture. Japan pledged "overt support" within its limitations as an occupied
country. U.S. State Dept. doc., U.S. Political Advisor, Japan (Tokyo), Telegram No. 40,
July 6, 1950, 1 p., SECRET, declass. Dec. 3, 1974. Mexico avoided taking "a formal posi-
tion"(U.S. State Dept. doc., U.S. Mission to the U.N., Telegram No. 30, July 6, 1950, 2
p., SECRET. declass. Dec. 3, 1974), but did not hesitate to informally offer propaganda
advice. U.S. State Dept. doc., U.S. Mission to the U.N., Telegram No. 24, July 7, 1950, 1
p., SECRET, declass. Dec. 3, 1974. Egypt promised to support the U.S. "in the event of
war with the U.S.S.R." U.S. State Dept. doc., U.S. Embassy, Cairo, Telegram No 19,
July 4, 1950, 1 p., SECRET, declass. May 6, 1974. Indonesia was not asked to do any-
thing, out of fear that its support might cause the U.S.S.R. to veto its application for
U.N. membership, which was then pending. U.S. State Dept. doc., Outgoing Telegram
No 13, to U.S. Embassy, Djakarta, July 5, 1950, 2 p., SECRET, declass. Dec. 3, 1974.
120. 4 Red Korean Columns Drive South; Suwon and its Airfield Outflanked; Situ-
ation Worsens, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1950, at Al; Burton Crane, South Koreans Kill Own
Troops by Dynamiting a Bridge Too Soon; Hundreds of Retreating Soldiers in Trucks
Blasted at Span South of Seoul, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1950, at A3.
121. REES, supra note 103, at 77-97; Hanson W. Baldwin, The Forces at Inchon,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1950, at As.
122. "Foe Disintegrated!" screamed the normally circumspect New York Times
headline. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1950, at Al.
123. REES, supra note 103, at 98-104. The first troops to cross the 38th Parallel were
South Korean, and penetrated the border in conjunction with MacArthur's call for the
North to surrender. Lindesay Parrott, South Koreans Cross 38th Parallel on 8th Army's
Order, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1950, at Al. Their ethnic background was no accident, and
was designed to minimize controversy over the aggressive nature of the action. Previ-
ously, crossing north of the 38th Parallel had been a matter of considerable debate (see
Hanson W. Baldwin, Invasion Gamble Pays; One of Big Questions is How Far North in
Korea U.N. Forces Should Go, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1950, at A6), and some Member
States, otherwise supportive of using force to expel the North Korean army from the
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thought, on October 7 the U.N. General Assembly passed a reso-
lution permitting the U.N. Command to enter North Korea
24
and, somewhat prematurely, set up a Commission for the Unifi-
cation and Rehabilitation of Korea. 125 U.N. forces then moved
across North Korea, through its capital of Pyongyang, 26 and fi-
nally to the Manchurian border at the banks of the Yalu
River.
127
South, contended that the U.N. had no mandate to reunify Korea by force. Nevertheless,
the United States was emboldened by its victory, and warned the U.N. "that the North
Korean Communists must not be allowed to retire behind the Thirty-Eighth Parallel and
pose a new threat to World Peace." A.M. Rosenthal, M'Arthur Calls for North Korean
Surrender; Indicates Crossing of Border to Supervise It, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1950, at Al.
U.N. authorization first came in the curious form of a resolution from the General As-
sembly's "Political and Security Committee." A.M. Rosenthal, Political Committee
Votes 8-Power Korea Resolution; U.N. Body Backs Crossing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1950, at
Al. This same issue was to be raised again in the Second Gulf Crisis, when U.N. forces
pursued the fleeing Iraqi army, and some parties suggested that Iraq be occupied.
124. REES, supra note 103, at 107-10; A.M. Rosenthal, Americans Cross Parallel
Above Captured Kaison; Assembly Backs Occupation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1950, at Al.
See General Assembly Resolution 376 (V), Oct. 7, 1950. According to GOODRICH and
SIMONS: "This resolution, by implication, confirmed the authority of the United Nations
Command to undertake the destruction of the North Korean forces by military opera-
tions north of the parallel and expressed approval of such a course." LELAND M. GOOD-
RICH & ANNE P. SIMONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY 469-70 (1955).
125. Britain had first proposed the creation of the Commission in late September of
1950, when MacArthur's forces "closed the Korean gap," making unification a real possi-
bility. A.M. Rosenthal, Allied Forces Close Korean Gap; U.N. Gets Plan to Unify the
Country, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1950, at Al.
126. See Lindesay Parrott, U.N. Troops Smash into Pyongyang; Korean Red Gov-
ernment Flees North, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1950, at Al.
127. Lindesay Parrott, U.N. Troops Race Unopposed Toward Manchurian Border,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1950, at Al. The Conflict had taken on harrowing global dimensions,
leading MacArthur to proclaim, "Our first line of defense for Western Europe is not the
Elbe, it is not the Rhine-it is the Yalu." REES, supra note 103, at 123-52.
Once United Nations forces were actually in combat, MacArthur's flawed notion of
the Yalu being the line of demarcation was quickly picked up by South Korean officials.
"Where is the 38th parallel?" President Syngman Rhee exclaimed. "It is non-existent. I
am going all the way to the Yalu, and the United Nations can't stop me." TRUMBULL
HIGGINS, KOREA AND THE FALL OF MACARTHUR: A PRECIS IN LIMITED WAR 55 (1960). "To
the Yalu" became the rallying cry of the South Korean officers aiding the United Na-
tions forces. See JAMES McGOVERN, TO THE YALU: FROM THE CHINESE INVASION OF KOREA
TO MACARTHUR'S DISMISSAL 36 (1972). The Chinese responded with their own call to
cross the Yalu, contending that the United States was "an unreasonable man-eating ti-
ger" and that North Koreans deserved to be assisted in their "just war." Henry R. Lie-
berman, Red China Whips Up Propaganda for Active Intervention in Korea, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1950, at A3. Less lofty concerns included China's desire to establish a
"cordon sanitaire" south of the Yalu, guaranteeing the security of Manchuria's border
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China had been closely watching MacArthur's progress since
his triumph at Inchon, and had amassed thousands of troops
along the Yalu, knowing that what they did not possess in terms
of weaponry could be compensated for by their overwhelming
numbers. 128 When the Chinese troops literally poured across the
border, U.N. forces beat a hasty and disorderly retreat.129 On
January 4, 1951, Seoul had to be evacuated a second time.130 Af-
ter the Chinese advance was halted, the General Assembly is-
sued a victor's resolution condemning the People's Republic of
China as an "aggressor."'' After a successful counter-offensive,
and insuring the flow of power from its hydroelectric systems of Manchurian industries.
CIA Memorandum, Walter Bedell Smith, Dir. of Central Intelligence, to the President,
Nov. 1, 1950, 2 p., SECRET, declass. Dec. 11, 1979, TRUMAN LIBRARY, PAPERS OF HARRY
S. TRUMAN, PSF. The C.I.A. concluded that the Chinese "genuinely" feared an invasion
of Manchuria despite the "clear-cut definition" of U.N. objectives. Id.
128. REES, supra note 103, at 136. See Hanson W. Baldwin, War in Korea Broad-
ens; Thousands of Fresh Chinese Red Troops Join Defeated, Disorganized North Kore-
ans, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1950, at A6. The actual numbers were staggering. Lindesay
Parrott, 60,000 Chinese Reds in War, More Ready; 500,000 Other Soldiers Massed in
Manchuria, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1950, at Al. By the end of 1952, over a million Chinese
were fighting with North Korean forces against the United Nations field forces.
129. MacArthur decried China's "intervention, without notice of belligerency" as
"one of the most offensive acts of international lawlessness of historic record." Text of
MacArthur's Communique printed in N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1950, at A5.
130. This was called "the big bug-out." REES, supra note 103, at 171-77.
131. See General Assembly Resolution 498 (V), Feb. 1, 1951, which declared the
People's Republic of China guilty of aggression. General Assembly Resolution 498 did
not recommend any additional military measures apart from those in place through the
Security Council, but it did affirm the U.N.'s "determination ... to continue its action
in Korea to meet the aggression" and called upon "all States and authorities to continue
to lend every assistance to the United Nations action in Korea." Id. See also Thomas J.
Hamilton, U.N. Assembly Votes Red China Guilty, 9 Countries Abstain on Move that
Asks for Study of Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1951, at Al. A subsequent resolution
[General Assembly Resolution 500 (V), May 18, 1951] recommended the imposition of
collective economic sanctions. Clearly, the People's Republic of China felt it was acting
in its own defense (despite the fact that it had provided steady covert assistance to
North Korea since the invasion), and in defense of its friend and ally. Government slo-
gans popular at the time reflected this popular belief: "Resist America! Aid Korea!"
JONATHAN SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 534 (1990). In fact, a special memo-
rial holiday of July 17-24 was created as "Resist American Invasion of Taiwan and Korea
Week." See REES, supra note 103, at 105. Stoessinger describes the irony well: "In the
Korean War, the victim of aggression was tempted by aggression, and succumbed to the
temptation." STOESSINGER, supra note 79, at 94. Nevertheless, U.N. Member States con-
tinued to be supportive of the use of force. Two Soviet resolutions charging that the U.S.
had committed aggression against China were stunningly defeated. A.M. Rosenthal,
Anti-U.S. Charges Rejected in U.N.; Soviet Move to Call This Nation an Aggressor in
China Fails in Political Committee, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1951, at Al.
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the U.N. forces again reached the 38th Parallel. 13 2 Armed with
the General Assembly's resolution condemning the Chinese ag-
gression, MacArthur publicly advocated extending the war to of-
ficially include China.3 3
However, MacArthur failed to consider the implications of
his advocation of war against China. The U.N., after all, was not
a war machine. Article 42 does not authorize interminable fight-
ing. The General also underestimated Truman's moxie. Truman
regarded MacArthur's conduct as a challenge to his authority as
Commander-in-Chief and as an attack on his conduct of foreign
policy. 13 4 On April 11, 1951, MacArthur was relieved of his com-
132. U.N. Patrol Enters Seoul as Tanks Smash Red Lines, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
1951, at Al.
133. REES, supra note 103, at 202-13. MacArthur set forth his proposal in a letter to
Joseph W. Martin Jr., the U.S. House Minority leader. Walter H. Waggoner, M'Arthur
Rebuke Likely; High Aides Confer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1951, at Al. MacArthur averred
that Chinese Nationalist troops should open up a "second front on the Communist-held
Mainland," and that "the fate of Europe should be decided in Asia." Id. Recently re-
leased State Department documents indicate that MacArthur may have been encouraged
in his brashness by similarly-minded members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See U.S.
State Dept. Overnight Information Policy Guidance No. 697, Apr. 20, 1951, 1 p., CON-
FIDENTIAL, declass. Mar. 27, 1975, TRUMAN LIBRARY, GEORGE M. ELSEY PAPERS. Tru-
man, who had the previous November survived an assassination attempt by Puerto Ri-
can nationalists, already had his hands full with awkward publicity arising out of their
death-sentencing, wherein the assassin Oscar Collazo alluded to the many Puerto Ricans
"fighting and dying" in Korea: "I'm not pleading for my life, I'm pleading for my
cause... the right of my country to be free. Now you have Puerto Ricans fighting for the
liberty of other people, but they cannot fight for their own liberty." Paul P. Kennedy,
Truman Assassin Sentenced to Die; Collazo Says He is a Martyr for Puerto Rico, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 1951, at Al. Also following Truman like a bad penny was the trial of
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who had both just been condemned to death. William R.
Conklin, Atom Spy Couple Sentenced to Die, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1951, at Al. MacAr-
thur had further divided American public opinion, and Truman was furious. Topping off
his bad week was the hair-raising statement of House Speaker Sam Rayburn, who picked
up MacArthur's lead and forecast "World War III." John D. Morris, A Third World War
May be Near, Speaker Implies to the House; Rayburn Intimates Russians Mass Troops
in Manchuria, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1951, at Al.
134. Truman was also feeling the sting of criticism at home as the Conflict plowed
along, with no end in sight. Truman for any Approach to Peace That is Honorable, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 1950, at Al. The morale of U.S. servicemen hit an all-time low. Walter H.
Waggoner, Acheson Tells Bitter Marine to Have Faith in U.S. Ideals, N.Y. TIMES,
March 4, 1951, at Al; id. for text of letters. See also Congressman Who Fought in Korea
Urges War's End, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1951, at A3. The fighting wad going on too long,
and the Conflict became unpopular even in South Korea. George Barrett, U.N. Losing
Favor by Korean Damage; Civilians Returning to Homes are Stunned by Destruction of
Allied Firepower, N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 1951, at A2.
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mand, and U.S. General Matthew Ridgway was placed in his
stead.'
135. REES, supra note 103, at 214-21; W.H. Lawrence, Truman Relieves M'Arthur of
All His Posts; Finds Him Unable to Back U.S.-U.N. Policies; Ridgway named to Far
East Commands, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1951, at Al. In his memoirs, Truman complained
specifically about the fact that MacArthur had issued a public statement in his capacity
as U.N. field commander commenting on U.S. foreign policy: "By this act MacArthur left
me no choice-I could no longer tolerate his insubordination." REES, supra note 103, at
442. Truman's comment has led scholars to question under whose authority a U.N. field
commander can be legally dismissed, since although Truman as U.S. President was indis-
putably Commander-in-Chief of U.S. armed forces, he theoretically was not in command
of U.N. forces pursuant to Article 42. His "Statement of Regret" only obliquely men-
tioned "the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United
States, and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Na-
tions" as the source of his authority to dismiss the U.N. Field Commander. Text of Tru-
man's statement printed in N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1951, at A8.
A more interesting test would have been for MacArthur to demand removal by the
U.N. Security Council, Military Staff Committee, or Secretary General (although such a
reproach would have been seen through American eyes as grossly insubordinate). Ex-
plicit in U.N. Charter Articles 46 and 47 is that the ultimate authority over the field
command resides with the Security Council, advised and assisted by the Military Staff
Committee. Although Article 47 is cryptically silent as to how a field command is re-
lieved [paragraph 3 states that "[q]uestions relating to the command of such forces shall
be worked out subsequently"], it implicitly cedes this authority to the Military Staff
Committee, consisting of "the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security
Council or their representatives." U.N. CHARTER art. 47, para. 2.
Truman would have been correct to have sought MacArthur's removal through his
Chief of Staff. However, he may not have been entirely wrong to act on his own initia-
tive, since MacArthur was also still under his command in the U.S. Army. Indeed, dis-
missals of U.N. appointees who are also employed in their national governments by a
Member State are actually quite a commonplace within the Organization. The problem
is called "secondment" [Higgins v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judgment
No. 92, UN Doc. AT/DEC/92, para. IV (1964)] and it arises when an individual is both
an official employee of his Member State government (such as the foreign ministry), and
at the same time is hired to work within the United Nations system (such as the Head-
quarters, Secretariat, or other division) as an international civil servant. See Theodor
Meron, Staff of the United Nations Secretariat: Problems and Directions, 70 AM. J.
INT'L L. 659, 678-91 (1976). The question of which employer-the Member State govern-
ment or the U.N.-deserves first loyalty is still unresolved in practice, although Secre-
tary-General Trygve Lie's averment that "[t]he independence of the Secretary-General
and his sole responsibility to the General Assembly of the United Nations for the selec-
tion and retention of staff should be recognized by all Member nations and if necessary
asserted, should it ever be challenged" is often quoted as authoritative. Opinion of Nov.
29, 1952, 7 UN GAOR, 2 Annexes (Agenda Item 75) 27, UN Doc. A/2364- (1953). The
issue of whether dismissal from the Member State's employment automatically termi-
nates one's U.N. employment has arisen several times [see, e.g., Yakimetz v. Secretary-
General of the United Nations, Judgment No. 333, UN Doc. AT/DEC/333 (1984); Levcik
v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, UNAT Judgment No. 192, at 16 (1974)], and
was most recently considered in Qiu v. Secretary-General of the United Nations, Judg-
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On June 23, 1951 the Soviets proposed a cease-fire and ar-
mistice. 136 These negotiations would prove to be complicated.
The People's Republic of China demanded that all foreign
troops withdraw from Korea. The United States, reluctant to let
history repeat itself, found this unacceptable. 37 The North
Koreans wanted the boundary redrawn at the 38th Parallel, but
the U.S. insisted on the present battle line, which in many
places was actually above the parallel. 138 The stickiest issue was
that of prisoners. The U.N. Command held 171,000 prisoners,
50,000 of whom had no desire to return to their Communist
homelands.13 The Communists, however, were determined to
get them back. This issue stalled further resolution of the Ko-
rean Conflict until after Stalin's death in 1953.110 The armistice
was finally signed on July 27, 1953, setting the boundary be-
ment No. 482, UN Doc. AT/DEC/482 (1991). While Qiu did not prohibit secondment
outrightly, it did weaken it as acceptable practice. See John Knox, Comment, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 686, 688 (1991). Under a theory of secondment, Truman could have relieved
MacArthur of his general command for any reason, or no reason at all, and this would
necessarily have entailed MacArthur's departure from Korea as well. Clearly, such a situ-
ation may be quite undesirable; it is undoubtedly an imperfection and an issue to be
addressed in future Article 42 actions.
136. The Recall and the MacArthur Hearings in BURTON I. KAUFMAN, THE KOREAN
WAR: CHALLENGES IN CRISIS, CREDIBILITY, AND COMMAND 190-91 (1986). The fact that the
Soviets made the proposal gave rise to a unique set of public relations problems for the
United States. Recently released State Department documents are especially enlighten-
ing as to the depth of U.S. government control over the media in reporting on the Con-
flict. See, e.g., U.S. State Dept. Overnight Information Policy Guidance No. 747, July 2.
1951, 1 p., CONFIDENTIAL, declass. Mar. 27, 1975, TRUMAN LIBRARY, GEORGE M. ELSEY
PAPERS [Media instructed to use term "armistice" instead of "cease-fire" and should re-
frain from referring to Soviet-Communist overture as a "Communist peace offer," but
rather as "Communists have requested an armistice"].
137. KAUFMAN, supra note 136, at 198.
138. Id. at 200.
139. Jaro Mayda, The Korean Repatriation Problem and International Law, 57 AM.
J. INT'L L. 414 (1953); CIA Memo, Apr. 2, 1952, 1 p., SECRET, declass. Oct. 1, 1986 [Far
East Command's psychological warfare office informs the U.S. Ambassador in Formosa
that the majority of Chinese prisoners of war in Korea would, if permitted, choose to be
repatriated to Formosa]; CIA Memo, Apr. 2, 1952, 2 p., SECRET, declass. Oct. 1, 1986
[Chinese Nationalist press reports from South Korea that "nearly 80 percent of Chinese
prisoners of war" taken by the U.N. do not wish to be repatriated to the Communists].
Western media photographs usually showed fatigue-clad Asians broadly grinning in vari-
ous positions of supplicant surrender, appropriately captioned: "This smiling Communist
was happy to be captured." See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1950, at A3.
140. "With Stalin's death ended an epoch of almost total domination of the country
by a single person." Mayda, supra note 139, at 306.
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tween North and South Korea at the military line. A Neutral
Nations Commission for Repatriation was set up for prisoner ex-
changes; of these, almost 22,000 chose to stay in South Korea or
go to Taiwan.
Thus, the Korean Conflict lapsed into a settled stalemate.
The border between North and South remains under guard and
constant patrol to this day, and their peace is separate and
uneasy.
2. The Changing World Order
The Korean Conflict was the first genuine Article 42 action.
Its essence was that of emergency and rescue. The predominance
of the U.S. in conducting the action belies the role of the U.N. in
influencing both the conduct and outcome of the hostilities. Part
of the reason for MacArthur's dismissal is that he could not ac-
cept that police actions were not "total" wars, and were not nec-
essarily won or lost.141 The other factor was the expanded role of
atomic weaponry. In this fight, the U.S. had grown more aware
of the dreadful consequences inherent not in losing, but in win-
ning. MacArthur's replacement, General Ridgway, wrote later of
the Korean Conflict with penetrating insight:
The willingness to settle for a stalemate... was all that
brought peace to Korea .... We had finally come to realize that
military victory was not what it had been in the past-that it
might even elude us forever if the means we used to achieve it
brought wholesale devastation to the world or led us down the
road of international morality past the point of no return.142
141. For MacArthur, winning did not include stopping one's forces at the 38th Par-
allel-winning meant obliterating one's opponent. Embarking briefly upon a political ca-
reer after his involuntary retirement, MacArthur addressed the 1952 Republican Na-
tional Convention and bad-mouthed Truman: "It is fatal to enter any war without the
will to win it." MacArthur had also failed to salute Truman, his Commander-in-Chief, on
the latter's arrival to review the troops. This omission, although softened by a diffident
handshake, was considered a mark of gross disrespect. See RICHARD WHELAN, supra note
94, at 232, including a photograph of the handshake; JAMES McGOVERN, supra note 127,
at 2-3 (1972). MacArthur's open display of contempt for Truman made it easy for the
U.S. President to relieve him of his command. Nevertheless, this action raised legal eye-
brows because the "command" in question was a U.N., rather than U.S. one, and such
decisions should properly have been made by the U.N. Secretary General.
142. GEN. MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY, THE KOREAN WAR (1967). This statement clearly
illustrates the dramatic shift in ideas. In 1950, Dulles had decried such situations, declar-
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In a volatile situation involving the extreme bipolarity be-
tween two great powers, both of which possessed atomic weap-
ons, the major goal was not to win, but to reclaim the peace and
security. For the U.S., this precluded a total war. For the Soviet
Union, it meant being much more conservative in promotion of
the use of force to Soviet client-states. For both North and
South Korea, it meant being satisfied with a good fence and
chastened, if still unfriendly, neighbors and patiently waiting for
reunification by nonviolent means.1 " While the experience cer-
tainly did not end war, it sobered the international community,
highlighted new dangers of "Big Power" conflicts, and showed
that the U.N. could effectively marshall its powers and resources
and tug on the reins of power if it had to.
144
American bossiness in diplomatic matters attending the
turning points of conflicts is also relatively old news, and, in the
case of Kuwait, nothing of which to be ashamed. 4 5 While Pro-
fessor Weston undoubtedly has his followers, the fact that the
resultant international coalition of Member States was led by
the U.S., and that the U.S. worked hard to persuade, cajole and
even bully other Member States into doing its bidding, does not
make the handling of the Second Gulf Crisis "illegitimate" or
illegal under international law. Quite the contrary; this is the
process of politics and outcomes, a product of those ends that
are desired and worked for, and purely fortuitous events. In fact,
the German reunification and the apparent collapse of the So-
ing that "limited policies inevitably are defensive policies, and defensive policies inevita-
bly are losing policies." JOHN FOSTER DULLES, WAR OR PEACE (1950). Although one can
try to point to Vietnam for the truth of this statement, the issue then becomes one of
legitimacy.
143. As the case of Germany illustrates, such an event is not at all impossible, al-
though not easily foreseen.
144. Except for the Cuban missile crisis, World War III has not yet emerged as a
probability, and there have been no "Koreas" since the Korean Conflict.
145. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the conduct of James A. Baker III, U.S.
Secretary of State, once overstepped the boundaries of diplomatic good taste on Novem-
ber 29, 1990, when Yemen voted "no" to Resolution 678. Sounding more like a mafia
loan shark than the holder of one of the highest offices in the land, an angry Baker sent
the Yemeni delegate a note, reading: "That is the most expensive vote you have ever
cast." TRIUMPH WITHOUT VICTORY; THE UNREPORTED HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
182 (U.S. News & World Report eds., 1992) at 181. If the story is not apocryphal, Baker's
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viet socialist republic more than removed traditional impedi-
ments, such as the Soviet's Security Council veto of such Chap-
ter VII actions; 4" these events heralded a new multipolar power
structure, led unashamedly (if imperfectly) by the strongest pil-
lar of the newly emerging capitalist security community-the
U.S..117 About this there is nothing immoral, and certainly noth-
146. Or, at least, such upheavals have subdued them. The improvement in U.S.-
Soviet relations prior to the Second Gulf Crisis was undeniably fortuitous, to say the
least. But unlike the Security Council's consensus in the Korean Conflict of 1950, when
the Soviets boycotted the Security Council over the issue of China's nonadmission, the
passage of Resolution 678 was not simply a stroke of luck or an oversight; "for the first
time since the 1967 Six Day War," Rubinstein points out, "the Soviet Union did nothing
to shield a prized client from the consequences of its military folly. Not only did Moscow
watch from the sidelines as the Iraqi military machine that it had largely created was
destroyed, but it gave Washington the green light to proceed." Rubinstein, supra note
77, at 56. See also Bill Keller, Moscow Joins in Criticizing Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,
1990, at A6; Celestine Bohlen, Arms Flow Halted by Soviets: Moscow Suspends Long
Role as Nation's Main Supplier, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1990, at A10.
147. As a British writer has observed, "What distinguishes America is not its greater
or lesser goodness, but simply its unrivalled power to do that which is good or bad."
Mark Frankland, LONDON OBSERVER, Nov. 6, 1977. Professor Weston's objection to the
predominant role of the United States in the Second Gulf Crisis is undoubtedly founded,
at least in part, on larger and more ancient quarrels, stemming from that period of ro-
mantic American imperialism that so inspired no less than Dean Acheson to write of the
Korean Conflict: "To back away from this challenge, in view of our capacity for meeting
it, would be highly destructive of the power and prestige of the United States. By pres-
tige I mean the shadow cast by power, which is of great deterrent importance. Therefore,
we could not accept the conquest of this important area by a Soviet puppet under the
very guns of our defensive perimeter with no more resistance than words and gestures in
the Security Council." DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION: MY YEARS IN THE
STATE DEPARTMENT 405 (1969).
As was also true in the case of Kuwait, the United States was under no treaty obli-
gation to come to Korea's defense as an ally. However, the fact that U.S. armed forces
played a predominant role in both these conflicts should surprise no one. What other
Member Nation alone could have marshalled sufficient forces? See Martin Walker, The
U.S. and the Persian Gulf Crisis, 7 WORLD POL'Y J. 791, 794-5 (1990):
It is difficult to think of any other nation, at any time in history, that could within
six weeks have deployed 150,000 army personnel some 5,000 miles from their ba-
ses, with tanks and guns and war planes to match, and without denuding any of
its other outposts around the world. . . .The United States could lose the lot to a
devastating chemical warfare attack, and awful though it would be, the U.S. mili-
tary machine could not be seriously damaged by a loss of fighting power
equivalent to the whole British army. Even losing all four aircraft carrier task
forces now in the Gulf would still leave ten more to wreak revenge. Indeed, the
world has not seen this kind of power since the days of the Roman Empire.
While an "international force" seems to possess the appearance of being more legiti-
mate, or at least more neutral, than the forces of a great power, it is undeniable that
U.N. troops, such as they now exist, are lightly armed, unevenly trained and few in num-
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ing illegal.14
While Professor Weston may decry the Bush Administra-
tion's international lobbying efforts as unseemly and gloat over
the coalition's frangibility, these are picayunish concerns. The
United States' lobbying effort (including the bowing, scraping,
incessant pandering and paying for other's lunches that always
accompanies an important vote) was totally the right thing to
do, and it is hardly unheard of for Member States, especially
poor and weak ones, to take material advantage of rich and pow-
erful ones needing their votes.1"9 There is no evidence at all that
any Member State voted against its collective conscience or be-
trayed its national will because of American concessions. More-
over, the impermanence of the coalition hardly brands it as a
failure or a fluke. 150 Perhaps some scholars and politicians ex-
ber. When faced with a serious foe, bent on conquest, practice shows that the Blue Hel-
mets are little more than sitting ducks, easily routed and even murdered at will. They
would not have lasted a "New York minute" against Saddam Hussein, and would not
have compelled him to disgorge any of the fruits of his aggression.
148. Moreover, military strategists generally agree that "[c]ommand by committee
has never succeeded in war, and a committee composed of generals from four different
countries was not likely to be an exception." MAURIcE, LESSONS OF ALLID CO-OPERATION:
NAVAL, MILITARY AND AIR 1914-1918, 123 (1942). Even in ancient times, military coali-
tions were usually led by the strongest member. The Delian League, which was a coali-
tion of Ionian cities formed to protect the Aegean Sea against Persian invasion, was led
by Athens, its strongest member; its ships were commanded by an Athenian admiral,
albeit under the authority of the League Council. See WALTER L. WILLIAMS, JR., supra
note 51, at 119.
The issue of American globalism as a "deep conviction" that American ideals, inter-
ests and security should be indiscriminately imposed upon the rest of the world for the
good of humanity is a troublesome, but profoundly different, question. THEODORE H. VON
LAUE, THE WORLD REVOLUTION OF WESTERNIZATION 166-96 (1987). See also WILLIAMS,
supra note 78, at 53-83. In the Second Gulf Crisis, what matters is not who paid, or who
went; what matters is the multilateral nature of the consent for the use of force.
149. "There's the one thing no nation can ever accuse us of and that is Secret Diplo-
macy," said the humorist Will Rogers. "Our foreign dealings are an open book, generally
a check book." DONALD DAY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILL ROGERS (1949). The difficulty
is to draw the line between politics and outright graft. See, e.g., Robert D. Novak, Aris-
tede's Taiwan Connection; Mystery: What Became of Millions in "Aid" the National-
ists Gave Him?, N.Y. POST, Nov. 8, 1993, at 19.
150. That such alliances are considered unstable and short-lived is no secret. Alli-
ances are, after all, political facts. "No undertaking," wrote Macauley in 1857,
which requires the hearty and long-continued cooperation of many independent
states is likely to prosper. Jealousies inevitably spring up. Disputes engender dis-
putes. Every confederate is tempted to throw on others some part of the burden
which he ought himself to bear. Scarcely one honestly furnishes the promised con-
tingent. Scarcely one exactly observes the appointed day.
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pressed too much unbridled enthusiasm, too exuberantly; 151 cer-
tainly President Bush's pronouncement of a "new world order",
without any initial definition of what he was talking about, has
disappointed an expectant public and puzzled many commenta-
tors. 152 Yet the coalition's true significance may even have been
lost on the Bush Administration, which seemed to be offering it
as the durable model of a brave new world. 153 It is not. "But," in
the words of Barry Buzan, "it does suggest the general nature of
THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY 1ST BARON, 4 HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1980 (5th ed. 1857).
151. One could hardly be blamed for feeling good that the United Nations, usually
taking its lumps for being too moribund, had finally stirred and, if not actually van-
quished an evildoer, had at least caused it to taste the humiliation of televised retreat:
And hast thou slain the Jabberwock?
Come to my arms, my beamish boy!
0 frabjous day! Callooh! Callay!
He chortled in his joy.
LEWIS CARROLL, THE JABBERWOCK IN THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (1972). It is a pity
that Walter Lippman did not live to see the day, frabjous or otherwise.
152. The concept has a checkered reputation. "Global thinking is, no matter how
you slice it, still globaloney." See Clare Booth Luce, 1903-1987, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 19,
1987, at 43. For a spirited defense of Ms. Booth's invention of the word, see Annette
Richardson, "Globaloney" Rolls On, PuB. REL. J., Jan. 1991, at 6; Merrie Spath,
Quotebaloney? PuB. REL. J., Aug. 1990, at 5. Part of the confusion (and amusement for
those old enough to remember earlier New World Orders) was whether Bush was herald-
ing a "new" New World Order, an "old" New World Order [see FREDERICK CHARLES
HICKS, THE NEW WORLD ORDER (1920)], or perhaps, for Evelyn Waugh fans, the New
World Order "revisited".
Those unhappy with U.S. military action in Kuwait did not hesitate to seize the
cliche. See Michael Kinsley, Law and Order: U.S. Hypocrisy Involving "International
Law" vs. Iraq, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 1, 1990, at 4, in which Kinsley complains:
order . . . is at the heart of international law, an area of thought the U.S. govern-
ment has not had much time for during the past decade. Order, 'and the related
concept of sovereignty,' assert that the status quo has its own legitimate claims,
simply because it is the status quo and disturbing it risks 'chaos'-war, misery,
death-as Bush now says.
For Bush's interpretation of the New World Order as an increased role of the United
Nations in world affairs, see I Can Call Spirits From the Vasty Deep, ECONOMIST, Sept.
15, 1990 at 29: "'We are now in sight,'[Bush] continued, 'of a United Nations that per-
forms as envisioned by its founders.'" However, not even the ECONOMIST could pass up
an editorial shot: "He did not add that the United States is $670m in arrears in its
payments to that admirable organization." Id.
But see Jay Winik, The Quest for Bipartisanship: A New Beginning for a New
World Order, 14 WASH. Q. 115 (1991) and Bruce Russett & James S. Sutterlin, The U.N.
In a New Legal Order, 2 FOREIGN AFF. 69-70 (Spring, 1991), as examples of serious schol-
arship quick to fill the lacunae of media sound-bites.
153. See Walker, supra note 147, at 791 (quoting Secy. of State James Baker's Ad-
dress to the U.S. Congress), and 798-9. Rather than explain what he meant, Bush simply
stopped using the phrase after being teased by the press.
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security relations in a centre-dominated world, the mechanisms
available, and the ability of the centre to isolate aggressors who
threaten the recognized political order and the workings of the
global economy."15 International society is undoubtedly a
stronger and safer place because of it.
155
154. Barry Buzan, New Patterns of Global Security in the 21st Century, 67 RoYAL
INST. INT'L AFF. 431, 437 (1991). Buzan describes the Second Gulf Crisis as a model of
seven concentric circles:
In the centre circle stood the United States, which was willing to lead only if
followed and to fight only if given wide support and assistance. In the second
circle were others prepared to fight-some members of the centre (principally
Britain and France), and others of the periphery (principally Egypt and Saudi
Arabia). In the third circle were those prepared to pay but not to fight, primarily
Japan and Germany. In the fourth circle were those prepared to support but not
to fight or pay. This group was large, and contained those prepared to vote and
speak in favor of the action, some of whom (such as Denmark) also sent symbolic
military forces. It also included the Soviet Union and China as well as a mixture
of centre and periphery states. The fifth circle contained those states satisfied to
be neutral, neither supporting nor opposing the venture, but prepared to accept
UN Security Council resolutions. Within these five circles stood the great majority
of the international community, and all the major powers. In the sixth circle were
those prepared to oppose, mainly verbally and by voting. This contained Cuba,
Jordan, Yemen, and a number of Arab states. In the seventh circle stood those
prepared to resist-Iraq.
155. Id. at 438. Indeed, now (or at least for the moment), the world is almost en-
tirely free of traditional great power conflicts. While the possibility of a nuclear strike:
can never be wholly eliminated. . .the actual likelihood of a threat to our national
security from a Soviet invasion of Western Europe or a Soviet nuclear strike-the
two threats for which we are most prepared today and to which we have for so
long devoted so much of our wealth, talent and attention-ranks far below a host
of non-Soviet, and even nonmilitary, threats to that security.
Theodore C. Sorensen, Rethinking National Security, 69, 3 FOREIGN AFF. 1, 2 (Summer,
1990). See also RICHARD H. ULLMAN, SECURING EUROPE (1990); Soviet Disarray: And
What of the Engines of War? N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 10, 1991, at A19.
Temporary coalitions such as the one described by Buzan, supra note 143, may be
less onerous and costly to maintain than traditional alliances. But see Walker, supra
note 147, at 797-98, for an opposing view:
The diverse nature of the coalition illustrates the second paradox of the Bush
Doctrine, which is that the White House thrills to the idea of global leadership
but seems to shrink from the loneliness that leadership usually entails. The result
once again, as in the Korean and Vietnam wars, is a U.S. military operation
hedged in by junior partners, burdened by all the responsibility of command, and
bound by all the constraints of a formal alliance. The difference is that during the
Korean and Vietnam wars, the United States could afford to put its money where
its strategy was.
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III. ARTICLE 42: CAN IT STAND ALONE?
Although both the Korean Conflict and the Second Gulf
Crisis involved large-scale conflicts and mobilized the armies,
navies, and air forces of many Member States, neither action
gave rise to the formulation of an Article 43 agreement. Despite
the plainly obvious existence of Article 42 forces in both cases, it
is reasoned by some that an Article 42 force without an Article
43 agreement is in fact an Article 51 force. However, this is not a
question of putting the cart before the horse as much as it is the
Strict Charter Constructionists' claim that one cannot build and
effectively use a cart and horse without first drawing up an engi-
neering plan "proving" their existence.
Both Professor Weston and Professor Michael Glennon sub-
scribe to the "no Article 42 without Article 43 ' ' 156 school of tau-
tological thought, as do other prominent legal scholars. This ar-
gument is premised on a historical anomaly. Article 43 is a
unique Charter provision that dates from an earlier day when
the idea of world government was taken far more seriously than
it is now."5 7
Article 43 pledges Member States "to make available to the
Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special
agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities
.. . necessary for the purpose of maintaining international
peace and security."'158 It further provides that these special
agreements "shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initia-
tive of the Security Council" and "be subject to ratification by
the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitu-
156. See Michael Glennon, The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Na-
tions Charter, 85 AM.J. INT'L L. 74, 80 (1991); and Burns Weston, supra note 33, at 516,
519.
157. See generally GRENVILLE CLARK & Louis B. SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH
WORLD LAW (1960), for a comprehensive and detailed plan for the maintenance of world
peace through the United Nations and the establishment of global institutions, including
global legislative authority and global police enforcers. Although stymied by the Cold
War and our reluctance to "think the unthinkable," see HERMAN KAHN, THINKING ABOUT
THE UNTHINKABLE (1962), the world government movement persists "as an alternative to
collective doom, a movement whose political failure has obscured the psychological and
moral authenticity of its impulse towards species politics and a species self." See ROBERT
JAY LIFTON & ERIC MARKUSEN, THE GENOCIDAL MENTALITY: NAZI HOLOCAUST AND Nu-
CLEAR THREAT 64 (1990).
158. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para. 1.
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tional processes."'159 Because no Article 43 agreements have yet
been concluded "on the initiative of the Security Council,"
Professors Glennon and Weston allege that Article 42 actions
simply cannot exist.160 For the following reasons, this conclusion
is erroneous.
The most obvious argument for the severance of Article 42
from Article 43 is that, had the Charter's authors really wanted
to make these articles one inseparable concept, they would have
simply drafted it that way. However, they did not. There is also
no provision or explicit reference in the Charter as to the alleged
oneness of the two articles. Grotius would surely have frowned
upon relying on a treaty's parts, rather than construing it as an
indivisible whole; however in modern times it is not only possi-
ble, but "now constantly found necessary to dissect a treaty into
several parts and give them separate treatment."'' Modern
scholars have indeed pondered "what absurdities would result
from a pedantic insistence upon the wholeness of the treaty and
the inseverability of its provisions. ' '1
62
Article 43 provides a contractual mechanism for rendering
armed forces to the Security Council'6 and gives the action a
mandatory character. 64 It is in these qualities that its essence
159. Id. at para. 3.
160. See gen. Glennon and Weston, supra note 156. This reasoning might be infi-
nitely more defensible as a tautology if Article 42 was placed subsequent to, instead of
before, Article 43 in the Charter.
161. ARNOLD DUNCAN McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 474 (1961). This is admittedly
a departure from the traditional idea of totem praefectur unicuique parte, and yet an-
other example of the modern trend towards maximicide. THOMAS BRANCH, PRINCIPIA
LEGIS ET AEQUITATIS (3 Rep. 41). See also SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES: A
GUIDE TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION 256-61 (1970).
162. MCNAIR, supra note 161. See also H. TOBIN, THE TERMINATION.OF MULTIPARTITE
TREATIES, 250-65 (1933).
163. Although in practice, this comes closer to "duty" when read in conjunction
with Article 25. It is different from other Charter articles in that it not only sets forth
behavior, but requires Member States to "contribute" and "make available" tangible
things; Member States agree to furnish "armed forces" and "facilities"; "assistance" in-
cludes a possible plethora of tangible things, including money in hard currencies, and
tangible rights such as the "right of passage."
164. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 226-7 (1963), footnotes omitted:
As for the use of force itself, the Security Council, in the absence of the member
for the Soviet Union, recommended that members of the United Nations should
furnish aid to the Republic of Korea. Thus the failure to implement the obligatory
arrangements envisaged in Article 43 was circumvented by a 'recommendation' to
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lies. It has the unique feature of providing a limited role for
Member Nations' "constitutional processes" through ratifica-
tion, a role that is not found elsewhere in the Charter. ' The
result of this is to make each Member Nation's international le-
gal obligation erga omnes part of its domestic, municipal law.16'
That is Article 43's only purpose.
Article 43's linkage to Article 42 is historical in nature, dat-
ing back to the San Francisco conference 167 and shadowed by
similar provisions in the defunct Covenant of the League of Na-
tions.1 68 Due to intense disagreement over just about every as-
pect of the use and creation of the League Members' armed
forces as a "world army," no definite provisions for an armed
force were ever established under the Covenant. Thus, the
League lacked even a basic commitment to voluntarism, 69 al-
all the individual members.
See also LELAND M. GOODRICH & ANNE P. SIMONs, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAIN-
TENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 426-7 (1962).
165. See Glennon, supra note 156, at 76. Glennon chooses pithy quotes from the
U.S. Congressional debates, citing the Fulbright and Connally Resolutions as evidence
that Article 42 action is foreclosed until the creation and adoption of Article 43 agree-
ments through each Member State's "constitutional processes." But the quoted language
invoked by Glennon dates from 1943, when the Senate and the House were preparing the
way for the San Francisco Conference and the adoption of the Charter (and not Article
43 specifically), as "appropriate international machinery with power to establish a just
and lasting peace." In adopting the Charter, all Member States adopted Articles 42 and
43 as well. The "constitutional processes" to which Glennon's quotes allude are aimed at
ratifying the Charter as a whole, and not just a specific article or two.
166. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 200 (1990),
describing such "an obligation arising not out of a specific promise to another, but from
an obligation erga omnes which is not specifically assumed but is inherent in the status
of an endorser." See also Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International
Law? 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 420-422 (1983), on the issue of voluntarism in international
law and the blurring of obligations erga omnes with "what one is tempted to call obliga-
tions omnium" (an admittedly larger question, at last calling to account the sloppy rea-
soning that so often accompanies incident analysis). The danger Professor Weil rightly
perceives is that this type of moral and emotion-based thought is permeating interna-
tional law, to the law's detriment. Our resolution of this dilemma will depend largely
upon our progress from apology to utopia, like the search for the holy grail. For a truly
superior and aptly titled book on this subject, see MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY
To UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989).
167. See CONNAUGHTON, supra note 29, at 5-10.
168. Walter L. Williams, Jr., supra note 51, at 27-36.
169. See I. MILLER, 2 THE DRAFTING OF THE LEAGUE COVENANT 733 (1928). Article 16
fell far short of being a requirement:
It shall be the duty of the Council... to recommend to the several Governments
concerned what effective military, naval or air force the members of the League
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though it did manage to authorize some use of military forces on
two minor occasions. 170 Woodrow Wilson rationalized this weak-
ness, claiming that although it was not expressly provided for in
the Covenant, "armed force" was "in the background. . . .But
that is the last resort, because this is intended as a constitution
of peace, not as a League of war. '171
shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants
of the League.
170. These were during the Leticia Dispute and the Saar Plebescite. A third, the
Vilna Dispute, is generally cited; however, because of Polish and Lithuanian obstruction-
ism, forces were never actually sent out, although plans were in fact made for a multina-
tional force to be used through the League; its mission was "simply to perform police
duties." 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. 7 (1921). In the Leticia Dispute, the League simply
incorporated the troops of the Colombian disputant, but "internationalized" the force by
entitling it to fly the League's flag with the Colombian standard. The League/Colombian
troops, however, saw no action, especially after Peru withdrew its forces. 15 LEAGUE OF
NATIONS OFF. J. 977 (1934). The troops supplied through the League during the Saar
Plebescite were the most "international," consisting of Dutch, Swedish, British and Ital-
ian forces. This League force numbered 3,300 soldiers, and was equipped with armored
cars and tanks. A photograph of the "international force" at Saarbruck headquarters
shows a helmeted legion, armed with sash-tied swords and rifles with bayonettes. THE
SAAR PLEBESCITE: LEAGUE OF NATIONS, QUESTION 1 18-21, at 19 (pub. by the Geneva Info.
Section, 1935). Its mission was to stick around the coal-rich valleys until the last vote
was counted, and prevent anyone from making trouble. It saw no action. Switzerland had
been asked by the League to grant the force passage through an alpine pass, but Switzer-
land refused. See SARAH WAMBAUGH, THE SAAR PLEBESCITE, 282-5, 319 (1930); see gen.
W.R. BISSCHOP, THE SAAR CONTROVERSY (1924); SARAH WAUMBAUGH, A MONOGRAPH ON
PLEBESCITES (1920).
171. See I. MILLER, THE DRAFTING OF THE COVENANT 216-7 (1928). Franklin
Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, was more pragmatic. "The League may
not end wars," he cautioned, "but the nations demand the experiment." JAMES M.
BURNS, supra note 22, at 70. Nevertheless, Roosevelt pushed for U.S. membership during
his 1920 Senate campaign, challenging his isolationist opponent:
If the United States can enter the existing League of Nations in such a way that
the will of the League cannot be imposed on us against our will, and if it is made
clear that our constitutional and congressional rights regarding war are in every
way preserved, would you then, Senator Harding, favor our going in?
Id.
This was, of course, the major issue, and on this rock foundered all attempts at U.S.
membership.
One of Roosevelt's biggest (and most quotable) election-time blunders has been
overlooked by League scholars, probably because it was said during the campaign, and
quickly retracted. When doubts were raised about the influence the United States could
carry in such a body, amid allegations that Britain would control six League votes,
Roosevelt claimed that:
The United States would control a dozen-namely those of her little brothers to
the south. Indeed, he went on, he and Daniels really controlled two of these votes,
for they 'had something to do with the running of a couple of little republics.' He
48http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol5/iss1/7
ARTICLE 42 AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY
In 1945, at the San Francisco Conference, it was agreed that
Member States were not obligated to render to the Security
Council armed forces in excess of those provided for in each
one's special Article 43 Agreement.172 It was not the provision of
some forces, but the idea that the Security Council might be-
come a manpower drain on Member States' militaries, that was
the object of concern. This raised an inference that a Member
State cannot, or is not required to take any military action
under Article 42 until or unless it has concluded an Article 43
special agreement.41. This inference is erroneous. According to
Oscar Schachter, "Article 106 [of the Charter] clearly suggests
that interpretation.'' 1 7 However, inference and interpretation
alone do not make a rule, nor do they provide a solid basis for
Weston and Glennon's contentions. Article 106 reflects the polit-
ical understanding of the time at its creation, that the then-
great powers would be primarily responsible for maintaining in-
ternational peace and security in the post-war period.' 75 In fact,
it was the U.S. that urged inclusion of a Charter provision for
extending the Moscow Declaration interim commitment "to
cover the period up to the coming into force of the [Article 43]
special agreements by which the Security Council would be sup-
plied with armed forces and facilities.' 7  This matter-of-fact-
added with a smile that while in the navy he had written Haiti's constitution
himself.
Id. at 75-6. Even if true, it was an outrageous thing to say, and Roosevelt soon found
himself issuing apologies to the whole of Latin America. Like all candidates, he ex-
plained that he had been misquoted by the press.
172. U.N.C1.0., Documents, XII at 508. The Congressional Record on the debates
shows that the United States and other Member Nations clearly wanted a strong Secur-
ity Council, with a military force. Despite all the quotes available to the contrary, the
issue of an armed force had been a problem with the League; it was not a problem in
principle at San Francisco.
173. See gen. Glennon, supra note 156.
174. Schachter, supra note 43, at 452, 463.
175. GOODRICH, HAMBRO & SIMONS, supra note 45, at 629.
176. Id. at 629-30. The Moscow Declaration is composed of several individual decla-
rations; of concern here is the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security. It was
signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China. See
Tripartite Conference in Moscow, October 19-30, 1948, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. of Docs.
3, 3-7 (1944). Also printed in U.S. DEPT. OF STATE PUBL. 2298, TOWARD THE PEACE Docu-
MENTS at 6 (1945), and in RUSSELL & MUTHER, infra note 177, at 977. Paragraph 5 of the
Declaration established a commitment to the maintenance of international peace and
security, and provided that the four nations would "consult with one another and ...
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ness is also reflected in reports of the Dumbarton Oaks Confer-
ence, unanimously approving the concept of giving the
Security Council powers to undertake military measures.""8 The
plain meaning of the words "as in the opinion of the Security
Council enable it to begin" unambiguously leaves "the exercise
of its responsibilities under Article 42" '' e up to that U.N. organ,
and to no other organ, agency or Member State. Moreover,
"[n]othing in Article 106 precludes the five powers from making
forces available so that the Security Council can act despite the
absence of Article 43 Agreements. 18 0
While Article 106's linkage of Article 42 to Article 43 cannot
be ignored, it should not be accorded greater significance than it
deserves. This linkage is found nowhere in Chapter VII of the
Charter.'81 Furthermore, the Charter does not restrict the use of
anyone's imagination on ways to voluntarily supply the Security
Council with armed forces other than those proscribed in Article
43.
Although the U.S. posited that the provisions of Chapter
VII regarding military enforcement measures would remain in-
operative until the creation of Article 43 special agreements," 2
scholars have found it "difficult to harmonize such a conclusion
out of the language of Articles 2(5), 25, 39, 42, and 49. Members
with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the
community of nations." Id. at 5. Paragraph 6 provided "[tihat after the termination of
hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states
except for the purpose envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation." Id. at
6.
177. RUTH B. RUSSELL & JEANNETTE E. MUTHER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1945 680-87 (1958).
178. Id. The report notes: "One cannot overemphasize the importance of this unani-
mous vote, which renders sacred the obligation of all states to participate in the opera-
tions." U.N.C.I.O. XXII, Doc. 881, 508, quoted in ROBERT E. SUMMERS, DUMBARTON OAKS
(1945). For related documents, see U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, DUMBARTON OAKS DOCUMENTS ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1944).
179. See U.N. CHARTER art. 106.
180. GOODRICH, HAMBRO & SIMONS, supra note 45, at 631.
181. The one place it is found, as Professor Glennon notes, is in Trygve Lie's
memoirs which, insightful though they may be, are not especially persuasive. See Glen-
non, supra note 156, at 77. More intriguingly, this alleged linkage apparently did not
stop Secretary General Trygve Lie from finding an indeterminate legal basis for his
United Nations "guard" and "peacekeeping" forces-entities totally unprovided for in
the U.N. Charter.
182. U.N. SCOR, 2d Sess., 138th mtg. at 53 (June 4, 1947).
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are under the obligation to 'accept and carry out' the Council's
decisions and to afford 'mutual assistance in carrying out the
measures' the Council decides upon."' 8 s
These measures are not inevitably stymied because of the
non-existence of any Article 43 agreements. In a 1954 speech
about the Korean crisis, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold
commented that:
those who planned the aggression from North Korea made two
grave miscalculations:
They calculated that the world could be persuaded to regard this
as a civil war instead of an attack upon an independent nation
that had been made, in effect, a ward of the international commu-
nity by the majority of the United Nations. They also saw the
United Nations without power to resist the aggression in any
case, for the cold war had indefinitely postponed the conclusion
of the agreements that would have placed the intended military
forces at the disposal of the Security Council ...
Both calculations proved to be wrong.1 8
4
According to Hammarskjold, not only was the "conscience
of the international community aroused" by North Korea's ag-
gression, but the United Nations' military response set an im-
portant precedent-"one of those precedents upon which the
common law of peace can be founded and developed." 185 Specifi-
cally, Hammarskjold pointed out that Article 42 actions need
not be dependent upon Article 43 agreements:
Without any command by supranational authority [i.e. Arti-
cle 43 agreements], the majority of Members of the United Na-
tions responded to the challenge of armed aggression against a
small and distant neighbor in a way that the Members of the
League of Nations failed to do in the 1930's. This was a signifi-
cant step toward the goal of genuine collective security, because
the precedent itself provides a new and powerful deterrent
183. See GOODRICH, HAMBRO & SIMONS, supra note 45, at 316. According to
Schachter: "No explicit language in Article 42 or in Articles 43, 44, and 45 (which refer to
the special agreements) precludes states from voluntarily making armed forces available
to carry out the resolutions of the Council adopted under Chapter VII." Schachter,
supro note 43, at 464.
184. 2 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE SECRETARIES-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, DAG
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against another such aggression anywhere in the world.""6
Even more provocative is the August 9, 1990 statement by
the Soviet delegate to the Security Council, insinuating that
they would consider the use of force against a former client-state
by saying "We are prepared to undertake consultations immedi-
ately in the Security Council's Military Staff Committee, which,
under the Charter of the United Nations, can perform very im-
portant functions.118 7
Anyone paying attention at the Security Council meeting
would have immediately turned to Article 46, which states in its
entirety: "Plans for the application of armed force shall be made
by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff
Committee."'8 8 Article 47, paragraph 3 of the Charter unam-
biguously defines the nature of the Military Staff Committee's
very important functions in that ". . . [t]he Military Staff Com-
mittee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the
strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of
the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such
forces shall be worked out subsequently.' 8 9 The fact that it was
the Soviet Union, and not the U.S., that first raised the possibil-
ity of armed force during the Second Gulf Crisis, has passed al-
186. Id. at 270-1. Things did get briefly out of hand during the Korean Conflict. In
September 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson proposed the notorious "Uniting
for Peace" resolution--the immediate creation of a true Articles 42 and 43 international
force (in which he also included a proposal for a "peace patrol") that would not be sub-
ject to Security Council veto-a position met with strong and immediate opposition from
the Soviet Union. Uniting for Peace, GA Res. 377 (V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No.
20, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950), reprinted in U.N. YEARBOOK 193 (1950). See Thomas
J. Hamilton, U.S. Bids Assembly Take Powers of U.N. Council to Bar Aggression; Asks
Each Nation to Set Aside Special Troops to Serve World Body, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
1950, at Al; Text of Speech by Secretary Acheson at Plenary Session of the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1950, at A6; cf. Address by Vishinsky in the Assem-
bly's General Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1950, at A6. Despite its flawed constitutional
basis, Acheson's call to arms was quickly taken up by Chile, Belgium, and The Nether-
lands. A.M. Rosenthal, U.N. Treaty Urged; Chile Backs Universal Pact, Backed by
Arms, to Stem Aggression, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1950, at Al. See W. Michael Reisman,
The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 83, 84, 96-7 (1993),
for a critical evaluation of Acheson's plan.
187. S/PV.2934, Aug. 9, 1990, reprinted in 1 THE KUWAIT CRISIS: BASIC DOCUMENTS,
supra note 43, at 106.
188. U.N. CHARTER art. 46.
189. U.N. CHARTER art. 47, para. 3.
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most unnoticed.1 90
It cannot be doubted that the Soviets believed that they
were entitled to make a planned, concerted use of force in the
absence of an Article 43 agreement. Article 47, paragraph 3, re-
fers to "any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security
Council . . ." (emphasis added). Neither Article 43 nor its pro-
posed agreements are mentioned anywhere in Article 47, where
they logically should be if Article 43 agreements are as essential
as Weston and Glennon claim they are. While it is true that
neither the Military Staff Committee nor the Security Council
strategically directed the coalition forces, this is not because of
any illegitimacy or lack of authority, but simply a matter of
practicality. The Military Staff Committee was unprepared to
undertake strategic direction of armed forces at the time of the
Second Gulf Crisis due to its general lack of involvement in U.N.
matters during the Cold War.
Those opposing this view will point to the Korean Crisis as
proof to the contrary, forgetting how different the world was
then. The issue of fighting a total war using atomic weapons to
defeat the Communist menace was particularly grave in 1950.191
Only five years earlier, Truman had dropped two atomic bombs
on the Japanese, not just to end the war, but to alert the Soviet
Union and all other enemies that the U.S. possessed this weapon
of destruction, and was willing to use it.192 The use of these
atomic weapons irretrievably changed the nature of warfare. Al-
though the U.N. recognized the implications and took immedi-
ate steps to place some curbs on production and proliferation, 93
190. Throughout the Second Gulf Crisis, however, the Soviets emphasized that they
were "against reliance on force and against unilateral decisions." S/PV.2934, supra note
48, at 106 (emphasis added). The repetition of this phrase throughout the Security
Council debates in the various statements of the Soviet delegates indicates that, while
the Soviet Union was not adverse to using force, and had clearly implicated armed force
as an available option, it did not want to "rely" upon such force as the sole option, and
hoped ultimately for a more conciliatory solution. If armed force was to be used, the
Soviets made it plain that they wanted it to be a multilateral decision.
191. See JOHN W. SPANIER, supra note 79, at 15-40; JOHN MUELLER, supra note 22,
at 117-31.
192. P.M.S. Blackett, A Check to the Soviet Union, in THE ATOM BOMB: THE GREAT
DECISION 49-53 (Paul R. Baker ed., 1968).
193. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, 8, U.S.T.
1093, T.I.A.S. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3. See also LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN, THE NONPROLIFERA-
TION ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
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by 1950 the Military Staff Committee was technically out of its
league.' e4
During the Security Council debates on the Second Gulf
Crisis, the Colombian delegate insisted that Resolution 665 was
based upon Article 42, and could stand alone without Article 43
agreements. While it urged the Security Council to devise Arti-
cle 43 agreements for the future, Colombia did not claim that
the Council was without authority to act:
We are under no illusion that when the Council comes to
vote on this draft resolution it will be establishing a naval block-
ade, even though it may not say so, and that-though the Council
may not say so either-it is acting pursuant to Article 42 of the
Charter. That neither worries nor frightens us, but we wish to be
candid: We feel concern about other points of this draft resolu-
tion; we share anxieties. . .over the fact that. . .the Security
(1985); PAUL SZASz, THE LAW AND PRACTICES OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY (1970); OTTO HEILBRUN, ATOMIC WEAPONS AND ARMIES (1965). Neither the Mili-
tary Staff Committee nor Article 43 had been envisaged with atomic weapons in mind.
See RUSSELL & MUTHER, supra note 177, at 675-80. On the eve of the U.N. Conference,
Henry Stimson pointed to the gap between modern civilization's "moral advancement
compared with its technical development" of atomic war, and warned:
No system of Control heretofore considered would be adequate to control this
menace. Both inside any particular country and between the nations of the world,
the control of this weapon will undoubtedly be a matter of the greatest difficulty
and would involve such thorough-going rights of inspection and internal controls
as we have never heretofore contemplated.
HENRY L. STIMSON & McGEORGE BUNDY, ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR 635-6
(1947).
194. Significantly, the Second Gulf Crisis commenced in the wake of German
reunification, which had resulted in a profound and fundamental change in NATO de-
fense doctrine regarding the use of tactical weapons-moving away from "flexible re-
sponse" strategy to "weapons of last resort." Jim Hoagland, Bush Seeks Shift in A-Arms
Policy, WASH. POST, July 2, 1990, at Al. In fact, the whole purpose of Nato had suddenly
been called into question, and was described as "a pact without a purpose, an army
without an enemy." Glenn Frankel, NATO Tries to Change With Times; London Sum-
mit to Assess Goals, WASH. POST, July 5, 1990, at Al. "NATO must find a new reason to
exist," warned the Washington Post. "If it fails, the United States, the alliance's main
guarantor, may face a parallel loss of influence in Europe." Id.
In some ways, this diminishment of influence (in both West and East) paved the
way for increased interest in reviving the Military Staff Committee-first, in the First
Gulf Crisis (see, e.g., Working With Moscow in the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1987, at
A26; Paul Lewis, New Soviet Interest in U.N. Broadens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1987, at
A8), and again in the Second Gulf Crisis. See Frank J. Prial, Crisis Breathes Life Into a
Moribund U.N. Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1990, at A20; Paul Lewis, U.S. Seeks to
Revive Panel that Enforces U.N. Decrees, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1990.
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Council is delegating authority without specifying to whom....
As we look forward to the future we believe that from the
Council's point of view the lack of preparedness to cope with a
situation such as prevails today must be avoided in future. For
this reason we believe that, after 45 years, the Security Council
must fully implement Article 43. . . . The Council must be pre-
pared to deal with situations of this kind so it will not find itself
faced with a fait accompli. 196
Article 42 clearly stands on its own and distinctly apart
from Article 43, by reference to Article 39, which provides "[tjhe
Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken
in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore in-
ternational peace and security." '196 This provision, which does
not even mention Article 43 or require the conclusion of agree-
ments of any kind, has been recognized by the U.S. State De-
partment as being the Charter's pivotal provision. "If any single
provision of the Charter has more substance than the others,"
claimed the U.S. Secretary of State, "it is this one sentence.
197
It is therefore no surprise that the Security Council relied upon
Article 39, with its pointed reference to Article 42, for authoriz-
ing the use of force in Korea in 1950. The use of Article 42
armed forces through invoking Article 39 has been recognized by
serious scholars as an "innovation" which provided "a means
whereby a response could be carried out under United Nations
auspices despite the fact that the Council did not have at its
disposal the armed forces as originally intended under Article
43.,,198
195. S/PV. 2938, Aug. 25, 1990, reprinted in 1 THE KUWAIT CRISIS: BASIC Docu-
MENTS, supra note 43, at 118.
196. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
197. U.S. Dept. of State, Report to the President 90, cited in GOODRICH, HAMBRO &
SIMONS, supra note 45, at 293.
198. Id. at 301:
During the short period that the Council was dealing with the Korean question, it
directed its attention to the grave military situation. The search for a 'political'
solution was left to the General Assembly, which had in any event been dealing
with the problem of the independence of Korea since 1947.
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IV. RESOLUTION 678-VOID FOR VAGUENESS?
Part of the controversy surrounding Resolution 678 comes
from the authors themselves, who seemed to omit their basis of
authority. 99 Such omissions, however, are common practice.
"Typically," Professor Weston admits, "the Council does not
identify precisely the authority under which it is acting.
20 0
Resolution 678 sets forth, in pertinent part:
The Security Council, Recalling and reaffirming its Resolutions
660 (1990) [et seq.] . . . Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter
of the United Nations,
1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660
(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and decides
... to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of good-
will, to do so;
2. Authorizes Member States co-operating with the
Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January
1991 fully implements . . . the foregoing resolutions, to use
all necessary means to uphold and implement Security
Council Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant
resolutions and to restore international peace and security in
the area;
3. Requests all States to provide appropriate support
for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of
this resolution;
4. Requests the States concerned to keep the Council
regularly informed on the progress of actions undertaken
pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this resolution. ... "'I'
Clearly, the Member States derive their authorization "to
use all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution
660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore
199. The United States, which proposed the draft after consultations with other
Member States, has typically upheld an expansive interpretation of the self-defense doc-
trine, and Republican administrations have always been reluctant to even appear to cede
any "sovereign rights" to an international authority.
200. Burns H. Weston, supra note 33, at 519. Weston contends, however, that if the
United States and other nations are going to take extreme military actions, sending men
abroad to fight and die in foreign lands, the general public is entitled to know why, and
the source of authority should not be kept a mystery.
201. Resolution 678 (1990), reprinted in 1 THE KUWAIT CRIIs-BAsic DocuMENTs,
supra note 43, at 98.
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international peace and security in the area" from Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter. Furthermore, the request that "all States
provide appropriate support for the actions" and "keep the Se-
curity Council regularly informed" is found in Chapter VII. ' '
But, upon which article of Chapter VII did the framers of 678
rely?
Resolution 660 invokes Articles 39 and 40, which broadly
provide for the Security Council to "make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles
41 and 42. '' ' 03 Article 41 encompasses "measures not involving
the use of armed force" and "may include complete or partial
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal,
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the
severance of diplomatic relations. '0 4 Although extremely dis-
ruptive, Article 41 measures stop short of intentional violence.
This is not true of Article 42 which provides for "such action by
air, sea, or land forces" including "demonstrations, blockade,
and other operations." It unambiguously permits the use of
armed force."0 5
Resolution 678 seems not to invoke Article 51 self-defense
at all, although its vestiges may be fouind in the language refer-
ring to "all foregoing resolutions. 2 0 6 Resolution 661, a "forego-
ing" resolution, specifically relies on Article 51, "[a]ffirming the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense." However,
reliance on this slight reference to support an expansionist inter-
202. "All necessary means," et seq. would logically include "such actions by air, sea,
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and secur-
ity" as set forth in Article 42.
203. If Resolution 660 was enacted only pursuant to Article 51, the reference is curi-
ous indeed.
204. These are, admittedly, measures which a state may take on its own initiative,
without any invasion of sovereignty in the traditional sense especially to the extent that
such acts involve predominantly domestic considerations. However, such unilateral steps
might violate other international legal instruments and agreements.
205. Nor is there any requirement that the Article 41 sanctions "be given time to
work." Article 42's language on this point is quite specific, requiring only that "the Se-
curity Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or
have proven to be inadequate," (emphasis added).
206. Resolution 678 stated generally that the Security Council is "[aicting under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations," and more specifically "[rJecalling
and [rJeaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666
(1990), 669 (1990), 670 (1990), 674 (1990) and 677 (1990)."
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pretation of Article 51 is misplaced.2"7
Interestingly, according to Bob Woodward's account in THE
COMMANDERS, Bush administration lawyers originally were in
favor of Resolution 678 "spelling out directly the authority for
use of force."2"' While all other Security Council members
agreed with the proposal, Soviet support was questionable.20 9
Woodward reports:
Baker presented Shevardnadze with a draft that included the
phrase 'use of force.' 'Can you live with this?' Baker asked. 'After
our Afghanistan experience, that won't fly with the Soviet peo-
ple,' Shevardnadze said. There had to be some other way, an indi-
rect way of saying it, a euphemism. The Soviets could support the
idea of force but the resolution itself had to be vague.2 10
After some debate, Baker agreed to have the resolution read "all
necessary means." 211 They agreed to rely on Baker's post-vote
statement to "characterize the resolution as an unambiguous au-
thority to use 'force.' That would be a permanent part of the
record, and if no one objected, it would stand as the interpreta-
tion of 'all necessary means.' "212
Therefore, although the international consensus eventually
reached through the drafts and debates on Resolution 678 was of
great political importance and probably a necessary prelude to
any actual use of force, the legal entitlement to use aggressive
Chapter VII force (as opposed to pure Article 51 self-defense)
had been present all along since Resolution 660. As to Kuwait,
Article 51 could only have really come into play prior to the en-
actment of Resolution 660. On August 2, 1990, when Resolution
207. See, e.g., HIGGINS, supra note 153, at 208-9: "Defence of the self cannot be
collective; though there may exist collective security or mutual aid."
208. BOB WOODWARD, THE COMMANDERS 210, (1991). Fred Green, a senior lawyer for
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, states that Woodward's reporting is "about 94% reliable." It is
not clear from Woodward's account of this negotiation, however, whether this "spelling
out" meant actually stating the Charter article relied upon, or simply some other
language.
209. Id. See Eric Pace, Envoys at U.N. Say Soviets Block Endorsement of Force
Against Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1990, at Al.
210. WOODWARD, supra note 208, at 333-4. For an insightful view of the legal impli-
cations of this language, see Abram Chayes, The U.N. Never Said Saddam Must Go,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 1991, at D17.
211. WOODWARD, supra note 208, at 334.
212. Id. at 206-7.
[Vol. 5:211
58http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol5/iss1/7
ARTICLE 42 AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY
660 was passed, the framers were not concerned with Kuwait's
defense, but afforded themselves a wide array of options includ-
ing economic sanctions, non-forcible measures such as the sever-
ance of diplomatic relations,2"' and Article 42 use of armed
force. In fact, all the Second Gulf Crisis resolutions focus on
punishment, intimidation, threat of expulsion, and a call to ex-
pell, rather than any claim of self-defense (which would have
been purely illusory on the part of Kuwait). The date of each
resolution is important to the analysis.
The U.S. had evidence of Iraq's extraordinary troop move-
ments along Kuwait's border as early as July 16, 1990, when sat-
ellite photographs showed the unprecedented progression of So-
viet-made T-72 tanks shooting across the southeastern Iraqi
desert. 1 4 By the next day, more than 300 tanks and 10,000 men
were in place on the rim of Kuwait, with new divisions moving
towards Kuwait every day.21 5 By the end of the week, Iraq
moved over 35,000 of its troops to Kuwait's border within three
days.21 6 A week later, this number grew to 100,000.217
213. This measure is set forth in Article 41, although paragraph 3 of Resolution 660,
calling for "immediately intensive negotiations" and urging Member States to "support
all efforts in this regard," clearly mitigates against it.
214. The C.I.A. first alerted the White House to "the possibility of an Iraqi attack
on Kuwait" in early May 1990. PIERRE SALINGER & ERIC LAURENT, SECRET DOSSIER: THE
HIDDEN AGENDA BEHIND THE GULF WAR 26 (Howard Curtis transl., 1991). Evidence of
Iraq's intention to use force against Kuwait steadily escalated. See Youssef M. Ibrahim,
Iraq Threatens Emirates and Kuwait on Oil Glut, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1990, at Dl,
noting that Saddam Hussein "openly threatened to use force" against Kuwait if it did
not reduce its excess production. In response, Kuwait convened an emergency session of
its National Assembly, and sent envoys to Arab States to discuss Saddam's position.
Caryle Murphy, Iraq Accuses Kuwait of Plot to Steal Oil, Depress Prices, WASH. POST,
July 19, 1990, at A25. Although Western diplomats then hesitated to conclude that Ku-
wait expected an actual military attack, there was no doubt that Kuwait felt threatened.
Id.
215. In addition to satellite photos, Iraq's military buildup was also spotted by a
group of Western military attaches travelling overland to Baghdad across the Kuwait-
Iraq frontier, on the weekend of July 20. Nora Boustany & Patrick E. Tyler, Iraq Masses
Troops at Kuwait Border, WASH. POST, July 24, 1990, at Al. The attaches counted 2,000
to 3,000 Iraqi army vehicles moving south, transporting about 2 divisions of Iraq's elite
Republican Guards. "Convoys included tanks, armored personnel carriers and ground-to-
ground battlefield missiles," the Washington Post reported. Id. See also SALINGER &
LAURENT, supra note 214, at 45.
216. WOODWARD, supra note 208, at 206-7. See also Caryle Murphy, Mubarak Tries
to Ease Crisis in the Gulf, WASH. POST, July 25, 1990, at Al; Iraq Deploys Troops Near
Kuwait Border Amid Dispute on Oil, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1990, at A9.
217. WOODWARD, supra note 208, at 210. See also Iraqi Force Put at 100,000, N.Y.
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On July 25, 1990, Saddam Hussein, Iraq's president "a
vie ' '218 and commander-in-chief, summoned the U.S. Ambassa-
dor to Iraq, April Glaspie.2 19 Hussein was perturbed by U.S. Sec-
retary of Defense Dick Cheney's statement that the U.S. would
"take seriously any threat to U.S. interests or U.S. friends in the
[Gulf] region. '220 "What can it mean," asked the Iraqi president,
"when America says it will now protect its friends? '2 21
TIMES, July 26, 1990, at A6.
218. WOODWARD, supra note 208, at 158, 208. Such forms of address are common
among power-mad megalomaniacs, and are frequently made part of one's formal legal
title for legitimacy-enhancement purposes. Both Hussein and Noriega had been declared
"President for Life" and "Maximum Leader," respectively, by their legislatures, shortly
before their altercations with the United States. See Caryle Murphy, Iraqi Leader Gets
New Title as Kuwaiti Anxiety Grows, WASH. POST, July 20, 1990, at A12; Resolution No.
10, National Assembly of Corregimiento Representatives, Dec. 15, 1989, printed in U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, Foreign Broadcast Information Service LAT-89-241 (Dec. 18, 1989)
at 19, 20, from Spanish text in CRITICA (Panama City), Dec. 16, 1989, at 17, 27. "Baby
Doc" Jean-Claude Duvalier first styled himself President "a vie" in a 1978 advertising
supplement on Haiti published in the New York Times, but inherited his life-title from
his father, who had been given this tenure by a group of favorite generals. Homer Bigart,
Duvalier, 64, Dies in Haiti; Son, 19, is New President for Life, N.Y. TIMES, April 23,
1971, at Al. Haiti adopted a new constitution permitting presidency for life, allowing the
elder Duvalier to dispense with the inconvenience of elections entirely. Albin Krebs,
Papa Doc, a Ruthless Dictator, Kept the Haitians in Illiteracy and Dire Poverty, N.Y,
TIMES, April 23, 1971, at A44.
219. SALINGER & LAURENT, supra note 214, at 45.
220. WOODWARD, supra note 208, at 210. When asked which friend he had in mind,
Cheney was vague: "We have a lot of friends in the Persian Gulf," the U.S. Defense
Secretary replied obliquely. Caryle Murphy, supra note 218. More Machiavellian is Kis-
singer's statement regarding the Shah of Iran: "We cannot always assure the future of
our friends," he cautions, but "we have a better chance of assuring our future if we
remember who our friends are." HENRY KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE YEARS (1979).
221. WOODWARD, supra note 208, at 211. While Saudi Arabia may have been the
first "friend" to come to Cheney's mind, the United States' oldest and most obvious
"friend" in the region was Israel. While technically "at war" with every Arab state except
for Egypt, Israel had good reason to be wary of Iraq. On April 1, 1990, Saddam Hussein
had given a vitriolic speech, threatening to "make the fire eat up half of Israel if it tries
to do anything against Iraq." Id. at 201. Interpreting this to mean that Iraq would turn
its arsenal of chemical or biological weapons on the Jewish state, the State Department
decried the speech as "inflammatory, irresponsible and outrageous." Id. Iraq, claiming to
be stung by the United States' "overreaction", nevertheless had a special score to settle
with Israel, which had previously destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor. See Anthony
D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike Upon Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 584 (1983).
Iraq's embarkment upon a markedly escalating course of threat-making as a substi-
tution for international policy perplexed both Arab and Israeli military analysts. "I don't
think war is imminent or is going to take place," concluded a top Jordanian political
advisor. Jackson Diehl & Caryle Murphy, Saber-Rattling Abounds but Deterrents Curb
Both Sides, WASH. POST, July 2, 1990, at Al. An Egyptian official added, "Saddam. . .is
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Ambassador Glaspie responded that she had "direct instruc-
tion from the President to seek better relations with Kuwait."'
At a later point in the meeting, Ambassador Glaspie stated,
"[b]ut we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts like your
border disagreement with Kuwait. ' 23 Hussein replied that he
not suicidal. He knows he cannot win a war with Israel." Id. However, an Israeli military
source cautioned: "We don't know Iraq, We don't understand Saddam. We don't know if
he means what he says, or what he wants, or how to tell him what we want. That creates
tension in itself and opens the way to dangerous misunderstandings." Id. Another Israeli
expert declared, "Saddam is pushing the war strategy, saying that only by fighting Israel
can anything be accomplished." Id. For his efforts, Saddam's reputation preceded his
actual conduct only by a few weeks, landing him on the cover of U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT as The Most Dangerous Man in the World. Cf., Iran, Iraq Optimistic About
Talks, WASH. POST, July 18, 1990, at A17.
222. WOODWARD, supra note 208, at 211. See SALINGER & LAURENT, supra note 214,
at 45-63, for a transcript synopsis and interpretation of Glaspie's meeting with Hussein.
223. WOODWARD, supra note 208, at 212; SALINGER & LAURENT, supra note 214, at
58. In retrospect, this was definitely the wrong thing to say. Was Glaspie telling Saddam
Hussein (in "diplospeak") that the United States would not respond if Iraq used force
against Kuwait? Glaspie's curious statement is certainly open to that interpretation.
A similar circumstance arose in January, 1950 (three months before the Korean
Conflict), when U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave a speech before the National
Press Club, stating that South Korea was militarily dispensable within America's scheme
of post-World War II global security. Acheson described America's Pacific defense pe-
rimeter with some precision and, notably, excluded Korea from the U.S. umbrella of
protection. Subsequently, many critics charged that Acheson's speech had "invited" the
North Korean attack, or had tipped off the Soviets that the United States would not
defend South Korea because it was not worth the risk of total war. See ACHESON, supra
note 147, at 358. Quite naturally, Acheson defended himself, pointing out that "Australia
and New Zealand were not included either," but "the Russians" did not attack them.
But see SPANIER, supra note 79, at 19-21: "In short, it was not American words but
American policy that probably encouraged the Communists to believe that the United
States would not defend South Korea."
While some historians contend this conclusion is overblown, the fact remains that
such statements, made by persons in authority, send strong signals; enemies clearly feel
their reliance on them to be well-placed. Statements such as Acheson's and Glaspie's are
cases directly on point. There is a legal basis in international law for considering the
statements and declarations (including silence and inaction, where protest would have
been appropriate) of government officials as binding on their governments. See Nuclear
Test Cases (Australia v. France; New Zealand v. France), 1974 I.C.J. 253 at 267-70; Tem-
ple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) (Preliminary objections), 1961 I.C.J. 17
(Judgment objections), 1961 I.CoJ. 17 (Judgment May 26, 1961), (Merits), 1962 I.C.J. 6,
32-4 (Judgment June 15, 1961); Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Nor-
way), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, 36-7, 47-8, 51-2, 54-63, 72-3 (Judgment of Apr. 5).
See also SIR IAN BROWNLIE, supra note 61, at 637-9; H. Thirlway, The Law and Proce-
dure of the International Court of Justice, 1960-1989, Part One, 60 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 8-
17 (1989).
Bush's alleged disinterest in Iraq's "border conflict" was made all the more puzzling
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would commence talks soon with Kuwait via the mediation ef-
forts of his brother Arab President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt.
On August 1, 1990, with Ambassador Glaspie conveniently
out of town, Iraq lined up hundreds of tanks within three miles
of the Kuwait border in "a genuine line of death, miles long." '224
A few hours later, Iraqi forces crossed into Kuwait and soon oc-
cupied its capital, Kuwait City.225
Resolution 660, passed by the Security Council the follow-
ing day, makes no mention of Article 51. In fact, Kuwait, its
puny 20,000 man army, hopelessly outnumbered from the
start,226 made no pretense at a self-defense use of force, nor, cu-
riously, did Kuwait ask for any outside assistance, when such an
overture would have been undeniably appropriate and timely.227
by his same-day deployment of planes and combat ships in a "military exercise" with the
United Arab Emirates. See Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Deploys Air and Sea Forces After
Iraq Threatens 2 Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1990, at Al. Although the U.S. Navy
informed a House Armed Services subcommittee that U.S. ships in the Persian Gulf were
on "alert status", both the Emirates and the Bush administration issued a speedy denial.
See U.S.-Arab Maneuvers Denied, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1990, at A6. A U.S. military
official, imbued with the deliberate mixed-message policy of the Bush administration,
had this to say: We are not going to go to war, but you are going to see exercises and you
are going to see ships." Nora Boustany & Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. Pursues Diplomatic
Solution in Persian Gulf Crisis, Warns Iraq, WASH. POST, July 25, 1990, at A17.
224. WOODWARD, supra note 208, at 219.
225. Caryle Murphy, Iraqi Force Invades Kuwait; Tanks, Troops Storm Capital,
WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1990, at A17.
226. See Patrick E. Tyler, Iraq's Hussein Acts to Ease Gulf Crisis as U.S. Debates
Commitments, WASH. POST, July 26, 1990, at A34. 1989 military statistics showed Iraq
with one million men under arms, compared with 20,300 for Kuwait and 43,000 for the
United Arab Emirates. Id.
227. In fact, far from asserting self-defense rights, both Kuwait and the U.S. gave
vague and ambiguous responses when asked about using force to expel the Iraqis. See
Michael R. Gordon, Iraq Army Invades Capital of Kuwait in Fierce Fighting, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 1990, at Al. Bob Woodward notes, however, that on at least one occasion
prior to the invasion,, the Kuwaiti ambassador contacted Pentagon officials and con-
fessed that he was very worried about Iraqi troop movements, although he made no re-
quest for military assistance. WOODWARD, supra note 208, at 219. It must be remembered
that Kuwait had no formal treaty with any western state (except Great Britain; see, e.g.,
Dana Adams Schmidt, British Still Run the Persian Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1960, at
A16) providing for military assistance in the event of an armed attack, preferring instead
to "play on the superpower rivalry during the Cold War." David Hoffman, Delicate Gulf
Balance Undone in a Lighting Strike, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1990, at A25. Kuwait had
even opposed a common security pact with its Gulf neighbors. See David B. Ottaway,
Gulf Arabs Form Force; Units Will be Used Against Aggressors, WASH. PosT, Nov. 30,
1984, at Al. Even when a U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency officer showed the Kuwaiti
ambassador photographs of Soviet-made Iraqi tanks rolling towards his country, the am-
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The Kuwaiti delegate, addressing the Security Council on
August 2, 1990, initially seemed to reject the possibility of the
use of force, urging the Security Council to use its good offices,
including "principles of non-alignment and of Islam, righteous-
ness and justice," to somehow reverse the invasion "by peaceful
means and negotiations, and not through the use of force."2 '8
Although he described Kuwait as "defenseless and helpless," he
did not invoke any Article 51 self-defense provisions, or make
any claim to traditional self-defense rights at all. ' However, the
U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering announced that America
would "stand shoulder to shoulder with Kuwait in this time of
crisis." '' °
The White House plainly did not consider self-defense an
option as to Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Bush himself stated to
the press that he knew of the invasion but was "not contemplat-
ing the use of force" to rectify it: "I'm sure there will be a lot of
frenzied diplomatic activity," Bush said glibly. "I plan to partici-
pate in some of that myself." 3 ' Later that same day, with a
bassador simply shrugged: "What can we do?" Like Neville Chamberlain with Hitler, the
first reaction of Kuwaiti officials was passivity and appeasement. See Youssef M.
Ibrahim, Iraq Said to Prevail in Oil Dispute With Kuwait and Arab Emirates, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 1990, at Al. Kuwait clearly hoped that Iraq would be sated with its new
role as "the OPEC policeman" and withdraw its forces voluntarily, having made its point
about quota enforcement. Id.
228. S/PV.2932, Aug. 2, 1990, reprinted in 1 THE KUWAIT CRISIS: BASIC DOCUMENTS,
supra note 43, at 100.
229. Id.
230. Id. Other nations were notably more reticent: "I'm afraid we may have to sacri-
fice Kuwait as we knew it, to get out of this one," said one Arab diplomat. Youssef M.
Ibrahim, A New Gulf Alignment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1990, at Al. Even as late as August
17, U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar warned the United States: "Any in-
tervention, whatever the country, would not be in accordance with either the letter or
the spirit of the United Nations Charter." Paul Lewis, U.N. Chief Argues Blockade is
Hasty: Move by U.S. Military Would Violate Charter, He Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17,
1990, at A12.
231. WOODWARD, supra note 208,' at 225. One journalist on the White House scene
described Bush's "frenzied diplomatic activity" in distinctly comical terms. Maureen
Dowd, The Guns of August Make a Dervish Bush Whirl Even Faster, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
7, 1990, at A8. Other writers criticized Bush for relying too much upon his version of
"personal diplomacy," and not enough on red-flagged U.S. intelligence reports prepared
by experts. SALINGER & LAURENT, supra note 214, at 111. In the case of the Second Gulf
Crisis, Bush preferred to listen to King Hussein of Jordan and President Hosni Mubarak
of Egypt (both of whom assured Bush that Iraq would never invade Kuwait), rather than
his own intelligence experts who pointed out that the Hun was at the gate. Id. See Mau-
reen Dowd, The Longest Week: How President Decided to Draw the Line, N.Y. TIMES,
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greater understanding of the regional repercussions, Bush
changed his tune slightly by saying "[w]e're not ruling any op-
tions in, but we're not ruling any options out. '282
Four days later on August 6, 1991, the Security Council
Aug. 9, 1990, at A17; Ann Devroy, For Bush, Moment of Decision Came Saturday at
Camp David, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1990, at A31.
232. WOODWARD, supra note 208, at 232-4. See also R.W. Apple Jr., The Iraqi Inva-
sion: Invading Iraqis Seize Kuwait and its Oil; U.S. Condemns Attack, Urges United
Action, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1990, at Al. This language is the same quoted by Ian Brown-
lie of Oxford in his argument before the International Court of Justice on behalf of
Libya, concerning the United States' threats to use force against Libya on the issue of
extraditing two Libyan nationals accused of planting a bomb on a jet which exploded
over Lockerbie, Scotland. See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971
Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.),
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Gen. List Nos. 88[U.K.] and
89[U.S.](Order of April 14, 1992), and related documents. See also Stephan Alderman
and Len Freeman, MP Claims Syrian Link in Lockerbie Bombing, PRESS Assoc.
NEWSFILE, Jan. 21, 1992, at Parliamentary News, Statement of British Foreign Office
Minister of State Douglas Hogg, on the issue of using force to extradite Libyan nation-
als: "I have ruled nothing in and I have ruled nothing out."
This ambiguous phrase was heavily used throughout the Reagan and Bush pre-
sidencies, almost to the point where it became something of a cliche, if not a slightly
more dignified synonym for "none of your business." Reagan, when questioned on
whether he would follow through on his 1980 threat to blockade Cuba, replied: "I rule
nothing out and nothing in." Reagan Says Haig Met Key Cuban, N.Y. TimsS, Jan. 28,
1982, at A4. To put bite behind his subtle hint, Reagan added, "I would think that Cuba,
if they were smart, would take another look and see if they did not want to join the
western hemisphere." Id. Contrastingly the Bush administration first used the phrase to
describe its mysterious position on new taxes: "We're not ruling anything in or out."
Maureen Dowd, Bush Eases Stand, Saying New Taxes can be Discussed, N.Y. TiMEs,
May 8, 1990, at Al. Its taunting ambiguity found its niche, however, in the Gulf Crisis,
where it substituted for diplomatic skills, if not basic verbal abilities. On the issue of
sanctions against Iraq, Bush's Chief of Staff John Sununu cryptically replied, "I won't
rule anything out .... I'm saying to you, the decision is-the President has not made
any decisions. He gave you a kind of tone across the street, and I'm giving you one here
about it, but I caution you all not to-not to jump to too many conclusions." White
House Regular News Briefing (verbatim transcript), FED. NEWS Svc., Aug. 5, 1990. Even
the simple query as to whether Bush would be taking a summer vacation was answered
elliptically: "Nothing's ruled out." Id. On using force against Iraq, Bush dodged: "I'm
not going to discuss what I will or won't do."
The Soviets were quick to distance themselves from Bush's evasiveness; Gorbachev
told reporters, "I did not state that, I do not .state that." Charged with creating a picture
of U.S.-Soviet unity, Sununu put a Reaganesque spin on both Gorbachev's and Bush's
talks: "[They] were careful in their selection of language," Sununu told reporters, "mak-
ing sure that they were ruling nothing in and nothing out." John Omicinski, War or
Peace? Question Dominated Summit Talks, GANNET NEWS Svc., Sept. 10, 1990. Without
the slightest trace of irony, Sununu added that this exchange sent "a clear message" to
Saddam Hussein. Martin Fletcher, Symbolic Meeting "Lacks Substance", THE TIMES,
Sept. 10, 1990, at Overseas News.
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passed Resolution 661 affirming "the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense, in regard to the armed attack by Iraq
against Kuwait, ' 23 3 and specifically invoked Article 51. However,
Resolution 661 did not set forth any Article 51 plan or guide-
lines, but instead, merely recited a litany of economic sanc-
tions.2 3 4 This August 6th invocation of Article 51 was inappro-
233. See Resolution 661 (1990). Here, what constitutes an "armed attack" is entirely
unambiguous. However, it is beyond question that, by noon the same day, the invasion
was a fait accompli as to Kuwait. Iraq's tanks then moved posthaste towards the Saudi
border. See Michael R. Gordon, Iraqis Dig in Around Kuwait, Suggesting no Plan for
Early Pullout; Brief Foray Into Saudi Arabia, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1990, at A14. In fact,
why Saddam Hussein subsequently stopped at that juncture remains a mystery. Saudi
forces would have been little more than speed bumps to his battalions. Certainly, Iraq's
contention of August 9, 1990, that Iraq only intended to reunite itself with "a part of the
region cherished by Iraq-Kuwait," is possible. However, it is more likely that, by that
time, the United States had effectively communicated that it would defend Saudi Ara-
bia, and Iraq backed off (or "blinked," as Bush would say). See, e.g., Andrew Rosenthal,
Bush Sends U.S. Force to Saudi Arabia as Kingdom Agrees to Confront Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1990, at Al; Michael R. Gordon, Bush's Aims: Deter Attack, Send a Sig-
nal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1990, at Al. Such Iraqi backtracks litter the pre-conflict engage-
ment landscape. When Saddam Hussein held foreign citizens as "guests" and the United
States protested this as an international law violation and claimed the right to use force
to get them back, Hussein released them. Walter Goodman, TV Critic's Notebook; Iraq's
Leader Entertains "Guests" Not "Hostages", N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1990, at All; Elaine
Sciolino, Iraqi TV Shows a Smiling Leader With Grim-Faced British Captives, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 24, 1990, at Al. See John F. Burns, Iraqi Leader Says He Will Free Foreign
Women and Children, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1990, at Al; Joseph B. Treaster, Hostage
Evacuation Flights Resume From Iraqi Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1990, at A15. In
fact, not only did Hussein release them, but he formally apologized to his "guests" and
"heroes of peace," acknowledging that his action was not "correct from the humanitarian
and practical standpoints" and against "established norms," and explaining that his hos-
tage-taking had been a necessary self-defense measure to protect Iraq from attack. Pat-
rick E. Tyler, Standoff in the Gulf; Iraqi Leader declares He Will Free Hostages to
Promote Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES, December 7, 1990, at Al. Use of the word "guest"
brought a scolding from New York's notorious hotelier Leona Helmsley, who para-
phrased her own popular advertisements: "I know something about how to treat guests,"
Ms. Helmsley lectured Hussein in a full-page New York Times ad. "The people held in
your grasp are not guests. They are hostages." With the Mostest, N.Y. TMES, Sept. 23,
1990, at D7. President Bush referred to them as "inconvenienced people" until most of
them were safely out. Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Vows Not to be Cowed by the Taking of
"Hostages", Iraq Shifts Them to Targets, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1990, at Al. The euphe-
misms even inspired a William Safir column, On Language; Foreign Guests and Hos-
tages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1990, at B16. However, Bush's refusal to use the word "hos-
tage" may not have been so much to appease Saddam Hussein, but to differentiate the
incident from previous "hostage" crises that had resulted in damaging political fallout to
his predecessors in office. The word "hostage" had come to denote a stalemate-an un-
solvable dilemma-in U.S. foreign policy.
234. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, para. 3, 4, & 5 (1990).
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priate in that the Iraqi invasion, by this time, was over and
complete.2 35 Yet, the issue of self-defense was undoubtedly fore-
most in the mind of Saudi Arabia's King Fahd, since President
Hussein's forces were grossly excessive in number. 3 6 As early as
235. The position of General Colin Powell and the Joint Chiefs of Staff was that
"they were dealing with a huge, instant invasion that was now over and complete. Sad-
dam's initial mission was accomplished." WOODWARD, supra note 208, at 223. According
to Joseph Wilson, Deputy Chief of the U.S. Mission in Baghdad (and the highest ranking
diplomat after Glaspie's departure), Saddam Hussein described his invasion of Kuwait as
"a done deal." TRIUMPH WITHOUT VICTORY; THE UNREPORTED HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN
GULF WAR, supra note 135, at 91.
236. WOODWARD, supra note 208, at 225. See also Michael R. Gordon, Iraq Bolsters
Invasion Force, Adding to Worry on Saudis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1990, at Al. In one of
the few truly hilarious diplomatic exchanges after the Kuwaiti invasion, Saddam Hussein
attempted to assure the acting ambassador Joseph Wilson that he had no desire to in-
vade Saudi Arabia. After all, Hussein reminded Wilson, Iraq had recently concluded a
nonaggression treaty with Saudi Arabia and "Iraq respects its commitments." TRIUMPH
WITHOUT VICTORY; THE UNREPORTED HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, supra note 145,
at 90; SALINGER & LAURENT, supra note 214, at 108. In this thoughtful diplomatic dia-
logue, Saddam went so far as to accuse the United States of provoking Iraq to attack
Saudi Arabia-apparently with some cause. Id. at 138. "If you are really worried about
Saudi Arabia," Saddam assured Wilson, "your worries are unfounded, but if you are
showing that worry in order to worry Saudi Arabia, that is something else." Id. at 139.
When Wilson pressed Saddam for a formal assurance, the Iraqi leader replied: "We will
not harm those who do not harm us. Those who want our friendship will find us more
than eager to be friendly. As for Saudi Arabia, the question has not even crossed my
mind." Id. at 144. Proving that he could be coy as well as clever, Saddam said that Iraq's
"relationship" with Saudi Arabia "is strong-tell me if you know something we don't."
Id. Saddam also claimed to be unperturbed by the fact that Saudi Arabia had given
sanctuary to the Kuwaiti royal family, but at the same time, left himself an excuse for
future action: "It is natural, and we are not annoyed, that King Fahd receives the former
ruler of Kuwait. . . . We will be annoyed only if they allow them to work against Iraq
from Saudi Arabia." Id.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait had left Saudi Arabia between a rock and a hard place.
Apart from long-standing jealousies arising out of its oil wealth, Middle Eastern criticism
had just weeks earlier focused on Saudi Arabia because of the Mecca tunnel disaster. See
1,400 Die in Mecca Stampede: Pilgrims Crushed in Tunnel Trying to Escape Heat,
WASH. POST, July 3, 1990, at Al. The significance of this tragic accident should not be
underestimated in analyzing Saddam's subsequent actions against Saudi Arabia, whose
monarchs' prestige rests largely upon their guardianship of Islam's most sacred shrines.
Previously chastised for not controlling Islamic sect clashes within the Holy Cities of
Mecca and Medina, the Mecca tunnel disaster "has caught them by surprise," explained
an envoy of the Saudi Royal Family. "They are much embarrassed in an area that they
thought had everything under control." Caryle Murphy, Saudis Confirm 1,426 Killed by
Crush in Mecca Tunnel, WASH. POST, July 4, 1990, at Al. Iran, for example, lost no time
in challenging Saudi religious leadership, calling the stampede "a bitter incident" for
which Saudi Arabia "must answer to the Islamic World." Caryle Murphy, Iran Says
Saudis 'Must Answer' for Mass Deaths, WASH. POST, July 5, 1990, at A23.
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August 3rd, the U.S. shared photographic evidence with Saudi
Arabia that Iraqi armored divisions were steadily moving
through Kuwait towards the Saudi border. s  Saudi Arabia's mil-
itary forces numbered less than 70,000 men; clearly the Saudis
could not defend themselves without help. 38 It is probable that
Resolution 661 was written with Saudi Arabia in mind.23 9
The August 6, 1990 Security Council debates fully support
this contention. The predominantly expressed concern of the
Council was with Iraq's next conquest. Once again, the Kuwaiti
delegate Ambassador Abulhasan made no plea for Article 51 as-
sistance, nor did he assert any rights under it.240 Instead, he
claimed that Iraq's aim in invading Kuwait was "based on ex-
pansionism, . . . Iraq is thus threatening the strategic interests
of all the countries in the world, .... [and] .. .the Gulf region
237. WOODWARD, supra note 208, at 243-46. See also Michael R. Gordon, Iraq Bol-
sters Invasion Force, Adding to Worry on Saudis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1990, at Al.
238. WOODWARD, supra note 208, at 225, 242. Woodward alleges that because the
Saudis spent billions on American arms and military technology, the Saudis felt that,
with all the hardware, there was an "implied contract" that the United States would
protect them. Id. at 214. See also James LeMoyne, Saudis Twist Arms Much Harder
Now, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1990, at A5. According to LeMoyne, Saudi Arabia "un-
abashedly used the leverage its oil wealth brings. . .[to] strongly pressure foreign govern-
ments" to assist it. Id. " 'We told Japan and the Europeans that if they did not contrib-
ute to our defense we would have to consider closely all future contracts with their
companies in Saudi Arabia,' a Saudi official said. 'I think they got the message.'" Id. See
also R.W. Apple, Jr., Iraqis Mass on Saudi Frontier; Arabs Agree to Meet on Crisis;
Bush is Ready to Help if Asked, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1990, at Al.
239. For strict constructionalists, this enters the twilight zone of anticipatory self-
defense. A more cynical possibility is that the United States, mindful that it would be
difficult and controversial to reach a consensus for an Article 51 action as to Kuwait (at
this late stage), brought Saudi Arabia on board to provide additional support and justifi-
cation for sending armed forces into the region (an occurrence most Gulf States initially
viewed with distrust and alarm). This possibility is far from remote. An "invitation"
from a State visibly at risk would help to quiet protests such as the one from the Yemeni
representative, who warned the Security Council against using Resolution 661 "as a pre-
text for intervention." S/PV.2933, Aug. 6, 1990, reprinted in 1 THE KUWAIT CRISIS: BASIC
DOCUMENTS, supra note 43, at 105. See also Thomas L. Friedman, Battle for the Saudi
Soul, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1990, at Al. The Saudis, however, never asked outrightly for
U.S. assistance, and were initially reluctant to be "rescued." They had to be pressured
and cajoled into "asking" for "help." See SALINGER & LAURENT, supra note 214, at 135-6,
147. See also Excerpts from News Conference by Cheney and Powell at the Pentagon,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1990, at A16.
240. Although one could conceivably argue that, given that the right is "inherent,"
such assertions are unnecessary.
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is one of the most vital regions." 24 ' The United States' warning
that it would "not countenance the continuation or repetition of
this aggression" was subtle, but definitely dared Iraq to "do it
again."""
Three days later, Ambassador Pickering told the Security
Council that, pursuant to Article 51, the U.S. had taken action
"in consistency [sic] with Article 41 and Resolution 661 (1990),"
which he described as "entirely defensive in purpose, to help
protect Saudi Arabia. ' 243 He reiterated:
As Resolution 661 (1990) affirms, Article 51 applies in this
case. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the large military presence
on the Saudi frontier create grave risks of further aggression in
the area. This being the case, my government and others are, at
the request of Saudi Arabia, sending forces with which to deter
further Iraqi aggression.2 4
The United Kingdom also accepted an invitation to help
Saudi Arabia defend itself:
[A]t the request of the Government of Saudi Arabia my Gov-
ernment has agreed to contribute forces to a multinational effort
for the collective defense of the territory of Saudi Arabia and
other threatened States in the area. We will do so in accordance
with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which mem-
bers will recall was specifically reaffirmed in the preamble [sic] to
Security Council resolution 661 (1990).2
4 1
At a later moment in the debate, the Iraqi delegate dis-
claimed that his nation had exercised any territorial imperative,
241. S/PV.2933, Aug. 6, 1990, reprinted in 1 THE KUWAIT CRISIS: BASIC DOCUMENTS,
supra note 43, at 102. See also Paul Lewis, Security Council Votes 13 to 0 to Block
Trade With Baghdad; Facing Boycott, Iraq Slows Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1990, at Al.
242. Just the day before, President Bush was clearly contemplating some type of
action on behalf of Kuwait, although not necessarily defense: "This will not stand. This
will not stand. This aggression against Kuwait." TRIUMPH WITHOUT VICTORY; THE UNRE-
PORTED HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, supra note 145, at 80. See also Transcript of
Bush's Impromptu News Conference, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1990, at A7, and WASH. POST,
Aug. 6, 1990 at A14. In his remarks, Bush did not mention Kuwait in conjunction with
Article 51, but averred: "And I want to see the United States move ahead soon with
Chapter 7 (sic) sanctions." Id., N.Y. TIMES at A7.
243. S/PV.2933, Aug. 6, 1990, reprinted in I THE KUWAIT CRISIS: BASIC DOCUMENTS,
supra note 43, at 105. The ambassador clearly meant "consistent."
244. Id.
245. Id. at 106.
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and had nothing but respect for "the territorial integrity of all
neighboring Arab States, including the brotherly country of
Saudi Arabia. '2 48 Iraq had not committed an act of violence
against its brother-sister Kuwait, but had corrected an historic
wrong inflicted on Iraq by "the colonizers," who "re-drew the
geopolitical map of the region in order to weaken the Arab
States." 247 Iraq's "eternal and irreversible unity" with Kuwait
was now "indestructible" and "complete." 8
Interestingly, Ambassador Pickering disputed this conten-
tion by pointing out that Iraq, in 1963 (not so long ago), had
recognized "the freedom, independence, the sovereignty and the
territorial integrity of the State of Kuwait. 2 49 The Ambassa-
dor's parting shot, though, was aimed at bolstering the idea of
self-defense and collective self-defense of states other than
Kuwait:
The notion that Iraq can take unilateral action to accomplish
some Arab objective which only its President perceives, of course,
leads us to wonder where does it end? Does it end in Kuwait?
Does it move on to Saudi Arabia? Does it move to Jordan? Or
does it move beyond, to other countries?150
Perhaps the most convincing proof of Resolution 678's Arti-
cle 42 nature is Resolution 665 (1990), enacted on August 25,
1990. Resolution 665's basis is clearly Article 42, although it does
not specifically say so. It called upon "those Member States co-
operating with the Government of Kuwait which are deploying
maritime forces to the area to use such measures commensurate
246. Id. at 109.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 108-09. See also U.S. May Send Saudis a Force of 50,000; Iraq Pro-
claims Kuwait's Annexation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1990, at Al. Although he claimed to
draw a "line in the sand" at Saudi Arabia, Bush ruled out an immediate invasion and
emphasized, "We're not at war." Id. "We have sent forces," Bush explained, "to defend
Saudi Arabia." Id. See also Excerpts From Bush's Statements on U.S. Defense of
Saudis, and Excerpts From Bush's News Conference on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,
both printed in N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1990, at A15.
249. S/PV.2933, reprinted in 1 THE KUWAIT CRISIS: BASic DOCUMENTS, supra note
43, at 109.
250. Id. at 109. See also Andrew Rosenthal, Strategy: Embargo; U.S. Bets Its
Troops Will Deter Iraq While Sanctions Do the Real Fighting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1990,
at A14; cf. R.W. Apple, Jr., Gorbachev Warns Baghdad to Back Off or U.N. Will Act,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1990, at Al.
1993]
69
PACE INT'L LAW REVIEW
to the specific circumstances as may be necessary... to halt all
inward and outward maritime shipping. 2 51 This resolution is re-
markable. Without specifically invoking either Articles 42 or 51,
Resolution 665 not only authorized the use of force, but
"call[ed] upon those Member States" to use their navies to for-
cibly stop trade with Iraq.252
Any doubts about Resolution 665's Article 42 basis were dis-
pelled by Ambassador Pickering, who acknowledged that it was
"a historic and significant decision":
Our Charter was founded on the fundamental principle that
the Security Council would carry a broad responsibility for the
people of the world for international peace and security. The
Charter empowers it to act in this regard, including the authority
to decide to use armed force. The authority granted in this deci-
sion is sufficiently broad to use armed force-indeed, minimum
force-depending upon the circumstances which might require it.
This is a significant step. On only a few occasions in the past has
this authority been exercised ...
The United States has vigorously sought and fully supports
collective efforts to respond to this crisis. It supports collective
efforts to enforce the trade sanctions strictly. United States naval
forces, in coordination with other naval forces in the area, would
use such minimum force only as necessary to accomplish that
purpose.
[T]he Government of the United States will coordinate the
actions of those of the many other nations that have sent naval
forces to the region. . . . We are also ready to discuss an appro-
priate role in this process for the Military Staff Committee.2 5
The U.S. made a careful distinction between the Article 42
essence of the undertaking in Resolution 665, and its previous
251. S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, para. 1 (1990).
252. See Eric Pace, U.N. Calls on Navies to Block Iraq's Trade; Resolution Permits
Use of Force, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1990, at Al.
253. S/PV.2938, Aug. 15, 1990, reprinted in 1 THE KUWAIT CRISIS: BASIC Docu-
MENTS, supra note 43, at 118-9. See Elaine Sciolino, The Deadline: An Arbitrary Diplo-
matic Deal Becomes an Imminent Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1991, at A10; Elaine
Sciolino with Eric Pace, The U.N.'s Watershed: Putting Teeth in an Embargo: How
U.S. Convinced the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1990, at Al. Sciolino and Pace contend
that U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker initially preferred an Article 51 action, but
was persuaded by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze "to reinvigorate a
moribund United Nations mechanism known as the Military Staff Committee as a collec-
tive way to resolve the Persian Gulf Crisis." Id.
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claims to be acting under Article 51. The Americans regarded
Article 51 as a safety net, always in place, always invocable if
things turned nasty:
The new resolution-665 (1990)-addresses the application
of the mandatory sanctions of resolution 661 (1990), specifically
against maritime shipping. It lends the full weight and authority
of the Security Council and, through it, the community of nations
to the efforts of States that are deploying maritime forces to en-
sure that sanctions are respected. It does not address other as-
pects of sanctions or other provisions of resolution 661 (1990) and
so clearly it does not diminish the legal authority of Kuwait and
other States to exercise their inherent rights.254
The U.S. was making it clear that it did not feel compelled
to go running to the Security Council if Iraq did something be-
yond the pale. Still, Ambassador Pickering clarified that this
was not a self-defense matter under Article 51, for if it were, it
would not be necessary to make the distinction. He stated:
Resolution 665 (1990) therefore provides an additional and
most welcome basis under United Nations authority for action to
secure compliance with the sanctions mandated by Resolution
661 (1990).25
Other representatives concurred. The French delegate, while
cautioning that Resolution 665 "must not be understood as a
blanket authorization for the indiscriminate use of force," stated
that the Resolution did provide for "the minimum use of force"
to be used "only as a last resort" and "limited to what is strictly
necessary.''256 "In each case," France averred, "the use of coer-
cion will require notification of the Security Council. 2 5 7 While
the delegate from Malaysia expressed his country's apprehen-
siveness, Malaysia supported the resolution, fully realizing that
it was of an Article 42 nature and, hence, relatively new and
untried:
[O]ne should not be so starry-eyed and imagine that, given
the present realities, there can be an international force under a
254. S/PV.2938, Aug. 15, 1990, reprinted in 1 THE KUWAIT CRISIS: BASIC Docu-
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blue flag policing and enforcing United Nations injunctions.
Given the need of the hour... the Security Council must, until
that day comes, be content with only the beginning of United Na-
tions control action, although Malaysia and others would have
preferred a more assertive and prominent role for the United
Nations.2 58
All subsequent Resolutions were enacted more vaguely
under Chapter VII; no articles were expressly mentioned as pro-
viding specific authority. However, Resolution 678 does invoke
Resolution 660, the "Articles 39 and 40" resolution;259 neither
Article 51 nor its distinctive language is mentioned, although the
words "all necessary means" clearly suggest that the use of force
is permissible.26 0 Since Resolution 678 incorporates Resolution
660 (Article 42) and Resolution 661 (Article 51), the authorita-
tive determination depends upon the facts of the situation. The
Security Council has left both options open. The present facts
favor Article 42, because Resolution 678 was enacted on Novem-
ber 29, 1990, which was months after Resolution 661 was passed.
As early as August 6, 1990 the U.S. and Saudi Arabia met to
discuss defense actions and it was determined that at least sev-
enteen weeks were needed to bring in sufficient forces to defend
Saudi Arabia.261 Saudi Arabia's "invitation" to the U.S.-pro-
posed coalition was accepted the next day.262 On August 8, Pres-
ident Bush appeared on American national television, demand-
258. Id.
259. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR (1990).
260. However, the fact that Hussein had not invaded Saudi Arabia, and was denying
that he had any such intention, would have made the invocation of Article 51 as a basis
for the use of force look pretextual.
261. WOODWARD, supra note 208, at 269. General Schwartzkopf estimated that an
"offensive" plan to "kick Saddam out of Kuwait" would take eight to twelve months. Id.
at 249. Also contributing to the delay, which, even without other factors being consid-
ered, incontrovertibly changed the character of the use of force from self-defense to en-
forcement, was the six-week "pause of goodwill" devised by then-President Gorbachev.
The Soviet leader hoped to exploit Iraq's status as a U.S.S.R. client state, and his own
personal popularity, to seek a peaceful solution. See Thomas L. Friedman, How U.S.
Won Support to Use Mideast Forces; A U.S.-Soviet Collaboration, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
1990, at Al.
262. The reluctance behind Saudi Arabia's "invitation" has been almost ignored by
Second Gulf Crisis writers (with the exception of SALINGER & LAURENT, supra note 214,
at 169), but it speaks volumes about inter-Arab foreign relations and the fact that the
United States often finds itself "out of the loop" when dealing with Middle East crises.
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ing the "immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of
all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. ' 263 However, he described the cur-
rent American troop movements as "wholly defensive. ' 264 Never-
theless, at some point early thereafter, the Bush administration
began to change its strategy to encompass offensive force op-
tions, including the more ambitious plan to liberate Kuwait, and
this change took time.
Moreover, the Soviets insisted upon the language in Resolu-
tion 678 "to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of good-
will," to withdraw from Kuwait. Shevardnadze told Baker dur-
ing their talks that the inclusion of this language was simply not
negotiable. Without it, the Soviets could not support the resolu-
tion. President Gorbachev in particular thought that he could
use the 47 days allowed in paragraph 2 to reach a diplomatic
and peaceful solution. These negotiations, which were ongoing
right down to the wire, also took time. While time is not every-
thing, it is an important key, for the more time passes, the more
the nature of one's undertakings change. The passage of time is
a determinative factor in differentiating between Article 42 and
Article 51 actions; neither type of defense is a completely static
right.
CONCLUSION
Article 42 is not an easy subject to write about, but it is an
exciting one, and its moment of truth is looming on the horizon.
Its study raises more issues than it resolves, because there is
nothing rarified about Article 42-it is all drama and danger.
Part of its fascination is that using Article 42 involves tak-
ing concrete steps and not simply mouthing the empty plati-
tudes to which we have become so inured. Anodyne resolutions
cannot obscure it-Article 42 demands action. Yet it involves a
surrendering of "self" to work-the "self" in self-interest. It
forces States to think differently.
Surrendering one's fate to the collective will always seems
like such a fair and good idea, until it is one's turn. All notions
of sovereignty aside, such things are inevitable in many ways.
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Yet, the idea of ceding real authority and power-the power to
topple, the power to kill, to vanquish-to an international or-
ganization is disquieting, especially when one's vision of the
world and one's order of things are not universally shared.
Article 42 frightens even the bravest, most confident of na-
tions; even though the U.S. propounded Article 42 uses of force
in both Korea and Kuwait, it is not exactly bolting from the
starting gate to promote the Article's further development.
Nevertheless, Article 42 is undeniably "back from the
dead," with or without Article 43 agreements. The time has
come to study it seriously. Articles 42, 43 and 51 are shrouded in
myths that must be dispelled by fresh scholarship. It will not be
a painless undertaking.
Part of the problem is that, no matter how "modern" we
think we are, we remain ultimately tribal in our outlook and
world views. We naturally resist the new, even if it is better. But
the world does eventually come around if one persists, and
things can change simply through the momentum of life and
death. Although this sounds grisly, it is not without its historical
truth: when tyrants are toppled or die, things loosen up; with
every new election, one's taxes go up or down; the same can be
said for unbelievers and their influence.
Max Planck, the German physicist and discoverer of the
quantum of action (also called Planck's constant), once wrote an
important, and indeed quite fundamental, paper contributing to
the understanding of the phenomena of heat. Those scientists
who did not ignore him worked hard to discredit him, but he
realized that, in the end, patience was everything:
Helmholtz probably did not read my paper at all. Kirchhoff
expressly disapproved of its contents.
This experience gave me an opportunity to learn a remarka-
ble fact: A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its
opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its
opponents eventually die.2 65
Or, more nicely put, things change. And if the flooding tide
of world democracy means anything, it means the old way of do-
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ing business will no longer hold. Article 42 does not exist in a
vacuum-the politics that periodically resuscitate it from its co-
matose state are always unique, but their commonalities are not
unknown. Both Korea and Kuwait have more in common than a
capital consonant. Both were places where the U.S. had neither
troops nor a strong tradition of defense, no meaningful expatri-
ate populations or possessions, no real reason to be there, fight-
ing. It is simplistic to say, "What about oil?" (for Kuwait), or
"What about geopolitics and the spread of Communism?" for
Korea. Even during the Falklands/Malvinas incident, it was al-
leged in some quarters that Britain had gone to battle only for
the oil supposedly under the distant, frigid seas, or (somewhat
inconceivably) to maintain a strategic position near the
Antarctic Circle.
While such an economic realist rationale is not an invalid
way of thinking, it is equally true that, not always, but some-
times, nations simply do what they think is right. Economics
and greed do not tell the whole story. In Korea, Kuwait, and
even the debacle in the South Atlantic known as the Falklands/
Malvinas incident, the most compelling issue was the right of
people to choose their destinies, and to be secure within their
own borders. In Korea and Kuwait, and in the Falklands/
Malvinas, nations and peoples had been annexed against their
will; power and unmitigated violence screamed at them from the
barrels of guns. It is not generally remembered in this cynical
age, but thousands of innocent, ordinary Koreans died in a light-
ning strike before the first U.S. troops landed on their soil. Life
was not so cheap in 1950 as it is today, and the world was genu-
inely horrified. Moreover, the U.N. had the political issue of Ko-
rea on its agenda since its inception. It could not sit idly by.
Self-defense is not only an art, but a luxury for many states.
Armies are costly, and forming them for long periods carries its
own dangers. The biggest advantage of self-defense is that it is
so easy-a rollicking, free-for-all show, carried along by almost
any pretext. While it will always have its place in international
law, Article 42 provides a better, if more demanding, way of
resolving violent international conflict. It will not stop conflict
from occurring; it is not a doctrine of pacifism, but one of disci-
pline and control. As such, it is far from being the favorite
choice of States engaged in international struggles. The accept-
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ance of Article 42 and its ability to develop as a legitimate
source of international authority will be an arduous process.
The best is indeed the enemy of the good.
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